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Dynamics of the Trump Administration’s Policy on the South China Sea

更新时间:2016-07-05

The domestic and foreign policies of the United States have witnessed significant changes over the year since Donald Trump was inaugurated as the US President. On the South China Sea issue, the tough stance that Trump and his policy team once signaled has caused concern by relevant parties about the overall situation and the China-US relations.

Generally speaking, despite their close watch on China’s actions in the South China Sea, Trump and his policy team lack comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the issue, which means a risk of misjudgment. On the other hand, it seems that the South China Sea is not a priority for the president who was elected under an “America First” platform. Therefore, an analysis of the direction and influence of the US South China Sea policy under the new administration is of great significance for China to safeguard its sovereignty and maritime rights and help maintain regional stability.

由巴丹吉林单站散度场垂直分布图可见(见图6),6月4日08:00 700~500 hPa为辐合,强度为-13×10-5/s,200 hPa辐散中心,强度为20×10-5/s,高层辐散强于低层辐合,表明高层辐散形成的抽吸作用十分明显。6月4日20:00,300 hPa以下均为辐散,中低层辐合,可见低层的辐合和对流上升运动明显。

The US Judgment and Actions in the South China Sea

The US government maintains that China intends to firmly control the South China Sea in the long term, and that the US has failed to effectively respond to China’s relevant actions.

China’s increasing control of the South China Sea

As far as the United States is concerned, China has become increasingly assertive on the South China Sea disputes. China has adopted an uncompromising stance on the issue of sovereignty, vigorously strengthened its actual control over the disputed areas, and promoted its maritime claims without direct military conflict with the United States. China’s construction of infrastructure and deployment of military facilities on the South China Sea islands and reefs helps strengthen its control over the South China Sea. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a US-based think tank,has repeatedly released satellite images of the South China Sea islands and reefs and surmised China’s intention to militarize the areas. In August 2016,a report published by the think tank claimed that China had built militarystandard hangars on three artificial islands in the South China Sea that can accommodate any type of military aircraft.1 “Build It and They Will Come,” CSIS, August 1, 2016, https://amti.csis.org/build-it-and-they-will-come. In December 2016, another CSIS report claimed that China had deployed air-defense facilities on the islands and reefs, which could be used to shoot down aircraft and cruise missiles.2 “China’s New Spratly Island Defense,” CSIS, December 13, 2016, https://amti.csis.org/chinas-newspratly-island-defenses. In February 2017, the think tank released imagery alleging that China had nearly completed structures intended to house missile systems on its three largest outposts in the Spratly Islands.3 “A Look at China’s SAM Shelters in the Spratlys,” CSIS, February 23, 2017, https://amti.csis.org/chinas-sam-shelters-spratlys. The US has been accusing China of providing repair and supply sites for various military forces under the pretext of island construction. On the other hand, the Chinese military has been strengthening its air force, navy and coast guard. In July 2016, the Chinese Air Force organized its first battle group operation in the South China Sea.Another operation was conducted after a short interval. In the two operations,the PLA Air Force dispatched multiple types of fighters, such as H-6K and Su-30, on combat patrols in the airspace over the Nansha (Spratly) Islands and the Huangyan Island (Scarborough Shoal). China has made it clear that these patrols promote the in-depth development of combat-oriented maritime training and improve the PLA’s actual combat capacity against various security threats. China’s air force patrols over the South China Sea have now been conducted on a regular basis.

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US strategic position in Asia-Pacific under challenge

The United States believes that currently it still maintains a military advantage over China, and it has conducted several Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea. In October 2015, the US Navy destroyer USS Lassen entered within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef of the Nansha Islands without authorization. In 2016, there were more US military activities in the South China Sea, along with the process of so-called international arbitration unilaterally initiated by the Philippines under the Aquino administration. In January 2016, the US guided missile destroyer USS Curtis Wilbur intruded into Chinese territorial waters of Xisha (Paracel) Islands. In May the same year, the Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer USS William P. Lawrence came within 12 nautical miles of Yongshu Reef (Fiery Cross Reef) of Nansha.In the coming June, the US Navy dispatched three Aegis destroyers to carry out patrol and surveillance activities in the South China Sea. In October, the guided missile destroyer USS Decatur entered Chinese territorial waters off the Xisha Islands. In February 2017, a US battle group led by aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson entered the South China Sea, a move the US Defense Department alleged to maintain what it considers the “freedom of navigation” in the South China Sea.

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传统媒体时代,媒体尽管对政策进行报道和解读,但对政策决策过程保密,缺乏与受众的互动,极少反映大众政策诉求(见图7),存在政策信息鸿沟。新媒体工具出现后,政府决策过程主动或被动曝光,公众与政府之间的政策信息落差减少,公民参与政府决策的壁垒逐渐弱化,各类利益诉求、意见建议等得以呈现并整合。

Despite these actions, the United States still feels powerless to counter the Chinese activities in the South China Sea, falling short of the expectation to change China’s posture in the region. Therefore, in addition to unilateral moves, the US has made financial investment to support its regional partners in capacity building with the aim of withstanding what it calls China’s “assertiveness”. In May to June 2015, then US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter visited Vietnam and signed the Joint Vision Statement on Defense Relations, which promised Vietnam $18 million to help it purchase US-made patrol boats to boost defense capabilities.In April 2016, the US announced that it would give $42 million worth of sensors, radar, and communications equipment to the Philippines to enhance the Philippine military’s capacity to collect information in the South China Sea. However, according to US judgment, such moves are not enough to help its regional partners catch up with China’s capacity building in the South China Sea.

Besides, the United States has been trying to persuade its allies and partners into its Freedom of Navigation Operations. During an interview with Reuters in January 2015, Vice Admiral Robert L. Thomas, Commander of the US 7th Fleet, said that the US “would welcome a Japanese extension of air patrols into the South China Sea as a counterweight to a growing fleet of Chinese vessels pushing China’s territorial claims in the region.”6 “U.S. Would Welcome Japan Air Patrols in South China Sea,” Reuters, January 29, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-southchinasea/u-s-would-welcome-japan-air-patrols-in-south-china-seaidUSKBN0L20HV20150129. At the Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition in March the same year, Thomas further proposed the creation of joint maritime patrols in the South China Sea by ASEAN member nations.7 “Joint Patrols and US Coast Guard Capacity,” CSIS, April 1, 2015, https://amti.csis.org/joint-patrolsand-u-s-coast-guard-capacity. During his visit to India in March 2016, Admiral Harry B. Harris, Commander of the US Pacific Command, also proposed joint naval patrols by India, Japan, Australia and the US in the South China Sea.8 “U.S. Proposes Reviving Naval Coalition to Balance China Expansion,” The New York Times, March 3, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/03/world/asia/us-proposes-india-naval-coalition-balance-chinaexpansion.html.

Up to now, however, no substantial progress has been made in the United States’ plan for joint patrols in the South China Sea. As US allies,Japan touched upon the possibility of its Self-Defense Forces patrolling the South China Sea, and Australia also discussed its position on the South China Sea, but both countries have highlighted the necessity of avoiding regional tensions. Japan has maintained a cautious attitude toward the joint patrol issue. Although it was once reported that then Japanese Defense Minister Tomomi Inada had agreed to join the US-led patrols in the South China Sea, and the US Defense Department also released information confirming the two countries to conduct maritime actions in accordance with international law to support the “freedom of navigation,”Inada soon clarified that her remarks had been deliberately distorted and that Japan had no plan to send its forces to conduct joint actions with the US in the South China Sea. Australian officials also publicly stated that they had not received any invitation from the US, nor were they ready to take part in any joint military actions in South China Sea. At the USAustralia “2+2” meeting in October 2015, the two sides agreed to further their naval cooperation, but also clarified that such cooperation would not include Australia’s participation in the US-led South China Sea patrols. In response to the abovementioned proposal by Admiral Harris, the Indian Defense Minister indicated immediately that India was not considering joint patrols with the US and other countries in the Asia-Pacific. The response was interpreted by Indian media as the country’s avoidance of any involvement in the US-China competition. ASEAN has also turned the cold shoulder on the proposal of joint patrols. For the Philippines, while it at first responded positively, when then US Defense Secretary Carter and his Philippine counterpart Voltaire Gazmin jointly met the press in April 2016 and confirmed the two countries’ joint patrols in the South China Sea a month before, in September the same year, the Philippines’ new president Rodrigo Duterte indicated that the country would no longer conduct such patrols. In October, the new Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana also announced the Philippines’ suspension of joint patrols, and requested the US Special Forces stationed in the Philippines to withdraw in the near future. It is clear that the US has failed to form a regional alliance to exert pressure on China.

The US military actions have failed to achieve desired results. At the same time, the US has admitted its lack of non-military means to counter China in the South China Sea. It is worried that some countries in the Asia-Pacific will judge its capabilities and commitment in light of its counter-China efforts in the South China Sea. If the US cannot effectively challenge China in the South China Sea, its dominant alliance system and its credibility as a security partner will be severely undermined.9 Amy Searight and Geoffrey Hartman, “The South China Sea-Some Fundamental Strategic Principles,”CSIS, January 26, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-china-sea-some-fundamental-strategicprinciples.

These basic judgments reflect the important consensus among policymakers and the academic community of the United States, and have become an important basis for the Trump administration to formulate its South China Sea policy.

Orientation of Trump’s South China Sea Policy

However, it is believed by many US officials that Trump’s “noises” on the South China Sea issue early in his office are understandable. Trump did not come from the establishment and lacks administrative experience. Therefore, it was difficult for him to fully understand the ins and outs of all the complex regional and international issues in a short period of time. As with Secretary of State Tillerson, despite his outstanding management competency, he was not familiar with foreign affairs. With too many things to take care of at the same time, it is inevitable that he might not be able to attend to everything. For the White House spokesperson, it needs so time to get used to challenges from the press besides understanding the diplomatic lines.

Tough position grossly exaggerated

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During the transfer period, Trump and his team released tough signals about China’s construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea.Trump accused China of building “a massive military complex in the middle of the South China Sea” before asking the US.10 “Trump Takes Fresh Swipe at China after Controversial Taiwan Call,” CNN, December 5, 2016, https://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/04/politics/trump-china-tweets/index.html. Rex Tillerson, Trump’s pick for Secretary of State, said at his confirmation hearing that “building islands and then putting military assets on those islands is akin to Russia’s taking of Crimea,” and that the United States might use its armed forces to deny the Chinese access to the islands.11 “Rex Tillerson’s South China Sea Remarks Foreshadow Possible Foreign Policy Crisis,” The New York Times, January 12, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/world/asia/rex-tillerson-south-china-sea-us.html. In his first press briefing, Sean Spicer, then White House spokesman, said when asked whether the President agreed with Tillerson’s comments: “If those islands are, in fact, in international waters and not part of China proper … we’ll make sure we defend international interests from being taken over by one country.”12 “What We Learned at Sean Spicer’s First Briefing,” CNN, January 24, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/23/politics/sean-spicer-press-briefing-day-one/index.html. Steve Bannon, once White House Chief Strategist and Senior Counselor to the President thought to have had an important influence on Trump’s policy, even predicted in an interview in March 2016 that China and the United States were “going to war in the South China Sea in five to ten years.”13 “Steve Bannon: ‘We’re going to war in the South China Sea ... no doubt’,” The Guardian, February 1,2017, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/02/steve-bannon-donald-trump-war-south-china-seano-doubt.

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Based on these remarks, some media have alleged that once the United States tried to deny China’s access to the South China Sea islands and reefs, it might face a powerful counterattack beyond the imagination of many. Although there is gap in term of military strength between China and the US, the Chinese navy has submarines, anti-ship missiles and other weapons specifically designed to destroy important naval equipment of the US, which are powerful enough to prevent or impede the approaching of the enemy’s navy. For some time, the argument that the risk of China-US military confrontation increases quickly gained popularity.

China is using military means to respond to the US actions in the South China Sea, warning US aircraft to stay away from the Nansha islands and reefs it controls. In May 2015, CNN reported that a US Navy P-8A surveillance aircraft received warnings eight times from the Chinese Navy during a reconnaissance mission over the Nansha Islands.4 “Exclusive: China Warns US Surveillance Plane,” CNN, May 20, 2015, https://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/20/politics/south-china-sea-navy-flight/index.html. In December the same year, two US B-52 strategic bombers approached the South China Sea islands and reefs. While the US defended that the mission was unplanned and that it had no intention to fly within 12 nautical miles of the South China Sea islands and reefs, the Chinese military had been monitoring the two strategic bombers and remaining on high alert in the whole process. In response to US warships in the South China Sea carrying out the so-called Freedom of Navigation Operations, especially entering the adjacent waters of the islands and reefs, China has employed warships and aircraft to identify and verify the vessels and issued warnings. In December 2016, the Chinese Navy seized a US unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) in waters of the South China Sea, provoking tremors in the West. While the US Defense Department attempted to defend the use of the UUV and demanded China give it back, China expressed its regret over the US dramatizing the incident.The Chinese Defense Ministry reiterated firm opposition to the frequent appearance of US military aircraft and vessels in waters facing China for close-in reconnaissance and military surveys, and required the US side to stop such activities.5 “China to Hand Over Underwater Drone to U.S. in Appropriate Manner,” Chinese Ministry of National Defense, December 18, 2016, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2016-12/18/content_4771612.htm.

The Trump administration’s policy on the South China Sea, which once aroused concerns, is now returning to balance and rationality.

A gradual return to rationality

Trump has been eager to fulfill his campaign promises after taking office,which has exerted a significant influence on domestic and foreign policies of the United States. However, the US bureaucracy is mature enough to play a role in guiding the president and preventing him from making major mistakes. It is the president and the bureaucracy that collectively influence the formulation of foreign policies.

Trump sticks to the principle of “America First” and cares about the interests and gains of the United States. Therefore, the US would not be a cat’s paw for any disputed party at the expense of its own national interests.The United States has come to realize that its interests in the South China Sea need not be won by defeating China. On the country, the stability of the South China Sea is in line with its needs to develop economic and trade cooperation and guarantee the safety of goods transportation. As he did not make any clear commitment with regard to the South China Sea issue during the election campaign, it is not necessary for Trump to demonstrate strength on this front after taking office. With the high level of difficulty and uncertain effects if disputes were addressed, the South China Sea issue is not a priority on Trump’s agenda. As far as the US-China relationship is concerned, Trump has revealed a possibility to take the South China Sea issue as a bargaining chip in the United States’ trade negotiations with China. Therefore, the US would try to avoid the conflicts from spiraling out of control, which would cause its loss of credible deterrence.

Inheriting the basic stance and behavior in the Obama period

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In the future, the United States is likely to maintain the consistency of its South China Sea policy, and is highly unlikely to sacrifice its South China Sea interests in order to gain China’s support on other issues. For example, the US would not reduce its military presence in the South China Sea or downgrade its involvement to win China’s cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue.As its Asia-Pacific policy is gradually taking shape, the Trump administration is reinforcing the US military deployment in the region. The US might expand its means of involvement in the South China Sea issue, such as by imposing sanctions on enterprises engaged in China’s construction activities in the South China Sea. The US would also encourage its allies and partners to shoulder more responsibilities, assigning tasks with regard to the South China Sea. While its allies and partners respond to China’s common actions, the US itself would focus on more difficult incidents.16 Amy Searight and Geoffrey Hartman, “The South China Sea-Some Fundamental Strategic Principles.”

First, highlighting the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes. During his stop in Japan in his first overseas visit as the US Defense Secretary, James Mattis expressed concern over China’s intensified activities in the South China Sea. However, he also clarified that the main direction of the United States’South China Sea policy is to employ all means, especially diplomatic means,to properly settle the disputes and keep the sea lane open. The US military stance should be one that “reinforces our diplomats in this regard. But there is no need right now at this time for military maneuvers or something like that,that would solve something that’s best solved by the diplomats.” Mattis also concluded that he did “not see any need for dramatic military moves at all.”14 “Mattis Says No Need for Dramatic U.S. Military Moves in South China Sea,” Reuters, February 4, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-southchinasea-mattis/mattis-says-no-need-fordramatic-u-s-military-moves-in-south-china-sea-idUSKBN15J061. Given that the US military has been accustomed to taking a tough position on the South China Sea issue, the new Defense Secretary’s emphasis of peaceful means in handling disputes aroused immediate concerns. The move was widely interpreted as the US withdrawing from the previous hardline stance taken by Trump, and may speak for the new administration’s South China Sea policy to a great extent.

Second, continuing the Freedom of Navigation Operations. The Freedom of Navigation Program was proposed in 1979, under the Carter administration,with a publicly stated purpose to challenge “excessive maritime claims” of all countries, including the US allies. When the United States considers that the maritime claims of one country violate the “freedom of navigation,” it will send warships or aircraft to conduct a test navigation or overflight to confirm that the “freedom of navigation” it advocates is not affected. This includes: forcibly entering the 12-nautical-mile territorial waters of another country in the name of exercising the so-called “right of innocent passage”; sending warships into the exclusive economic zone of another country to exercise the “freedom of navigation and overflight”; and intruding into the archipelagic waters that other countries regard as internal waters in the name of the “freedom of high seas, transit passage and innocent passage.” The US Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea are in fact challenging the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the international maritime order,provoking and damaging the sovereignty and security of China and other coastal states, and undermining regional peace and stability by virtue of its own military strength.

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The United States has repeatedly indicated the continuing of Freedom of Navigation Operations to demonstrate the inherent US position since Trump took office. The US Pacific Command has requested several times such operations in the South China Sea. In May 2017, the guided missile destroyer USS Dewey conducted the first Freedom of Navigation Operation in the South China Sea under the Trump administration. In July the same year, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS Stethem intruded into Chinese territorial waters of Xisha Islands without authorization. In August, another Arleigh Burkeclass destroyer USS John S. McCain entered the adjacent waters of the Meiji(Mischief) Reef.

While the US insists on such operations, it has attached importance to professionalism, avoiding accidental collisions that may provoke conflicts with China. A report published by the US think tank National Bureau of Asian Research in February 2017 suggested that China and the US maintain military communication over the South China Sea issue to avoid miscalculation,reduce confrontation and manage crises. The two countries should work together to prevent the escalation of confrontation caused by the United States’frequent Freedom of Navigation Operations. The two sides should continue to build a crisis management mechanism based on the two Memorandums of Understanding signed by the two defense ministries in 2014, which are the MOUs on Notification of Major Military Activities and on the Rules of Behavior for the Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters.15 Nong Hong, “Beyond the UUV Incident: Challenges in the South China Sea for the Trump Administration,” http://maritimeawarenessproject.org/2017/02/17/beyond-the-uuv-incident-challenges-inthe-south-china-sea-for-the-trump-administration.

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Underlying key principles still uncertain

Under the Obama administration, President Obama and his top-level officials, such as the Secretary of State, repeatedly claimed that the US takes no position on the sovereignty disputes of the South China Sea. In April 2012, when the China-Philippines tensions surrounding the Huangyan Island had yet to be settled, then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta held the “2+2” meeting with their Philippine counterparts. Clinton reiterated the US position of “not taking sides on the competing sovereignty claims to land features in the South China Sea” at the press conference after the talks.17 “Remarks with Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario,and Philippines Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin after Their Meeting,” US Department of State (2009-2017), April 30, 2012, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/04/188982.htm. During his visit to the Philippines in April 2014, President Obama again pointed out that “we don’t even take a specific position on the disputes between nations,” while stressing that “our primary interest is the peaceful resolution of conflict, the freedom of navigation that allows for continued progress and prosperity.”18 “Remarks by President Obama and President Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines in Joint Press Conference,” The White House (President Obama), April 28, 2014, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/28/remarks-president-obama-and-president-benigno-aquino-iii-philippines-joi.

It is one basic principle of the US South China Sea policy to take no position on the sovereignty issue. Such a stance can effectively avoid the political costs of taking sides and help the US to maintain its policy flexibility and maneuvering space. However, Trump and his team have yet to understand the importance of this position and have not issued any clear statement. Tillerson’s claim to deny China’s access to its artificial islands and Spicer’s indication that the US would “defend international interests from being taken over by one country” have fueled speculation and concern about the new administration’s South China Sea policy. Trump’s non-establishment approach increases the risk of miscalculation by the United States.

Trump has also yet to skillfully wield the principle of “freedom of navigation.” When talking about the South China Sea issue, Trump does not highlight the importance of “freedom of navigation,” nor take it as an underlying justification for US positions and relevant actions. US officials and the academic community are advising Trump to better apply this principle to meddle in the South China Sea issue, and have even suggested a “revival”of the South China Sea arbitration case initiated by the Philippines’ Aquino government.

Trump’s South China Sea Policy under Restraints

Although the Trump administration will remain involved in the South China Sea issue, it has become more difficult for the US to influence the situation as regional actors such as China and ASEAN are adjusting their policy objectives.

China-ASEAN objection to US meddling on COC

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Until recently, the arbitration case unilaterally filed by the Philippines’Aquino government was the focus of attention. Since the arbitration drama subsided, regional parties have come to recognize that arbitration would not help address the South China Sea tensions, which should be handled in a constructive manner. Currently, China and ASEAN are making concerted efforts to promote negotiations on a code of conduct (COC) in the South China Sea, aiming to develop commonly recognized regional rules and maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea.

Formulating the COC once took a detour, as the Aquino government tried to use the COC to materialize the Philippines’ territorial claims and maritime rights in the South China Sea, in the name of ASEAN’s collective will. The US has also been instrumental in urging the formulation of the COC as soon as possible.

In this regard, China has repeatedly stressed its willingness to negotiate the COC with ASEAN, but advocated that any agreed COC would not be a panacea of sovereignty disputes. Instead, China is calling for the ASEAN countries to foster a positive environment for the COC negotiations. Under the Aquino administration, the Philippines repeatedly triggered disturbances during multiple senior officials’ meetings, foreign ministers’ meetings and summits between China and ASEAN, accusing China of slowing progress on the COC. In August 2013, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, during his visit to Vietnam, presented China’s fourpoint proposition on the formulation of the COC, namely, reasonable anticipation, consensus-oriented consultation, elimination of interference,and gradual progress.

On the COC issue, China and ASEAN countries have been maintaining positive communication and promoting the formation of consensus. During General Secretary of Vietnam’s Communist Party Nguyen Phu Trong’s visit to China in April 2015, important consensus was reached and incorporated into a joint communiqué issued by the two countries. China and Vietnam agreed to jointly manage their maritime disputes, fully and effectively implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and reach an agreement on the COC through consultation as early as possible. In September 2016, a joint statement was issued at the China-ASEAN summit on the 25th anniversary of China-ASEAN dialogue relations. According to the statement, the parties concerned “remain committed to … working substantively towards the early adoption of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) based on consensus.”19 “Joint Statement of the 19th ASEAN-China Summit to Commemorate the 25th Anniversary of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations,” ASEAN, September 7, 2016, http://asean.org/storage/2016/09/Joint-Statement-of-ASEAN-China-Commemorative-Summit-Final.pdf.

FA16-T支持作为AG使用,可以通过IP承载网络,以SIP协议接入IMS或NGN网络,或者以H.248协议与媒体网关控制器MGC对接。在这两种情况下AG分别称之为SIPAG和H.248AG。

At present, negotiations on the COC have made important progress.A COC framework was agreed upon on May 18, 2017 at the 14th Senior Officials’ Meeting on the Implementation of the DOC in Guiyang. At the 50th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in Manila in August the same year,the COC framework was officially confirmed. On November 13, at the China-ASEAN (10+1) Summit, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and ASEAN leaders jointly announced the commencement of the next-step consultation on the text of the COC.

Thanks to unremitting efforts of China and ASEAN, the COC consultation remains on the right track. Any external country attempting to stir up the regional situation and interfere with the COC formulation will inevitably meet resistance across the region. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi gave an explicit warning that “if someone should try to make waves and stir trouble,then he will have no support but meet the common opposition of the entire region,” and that “China will never allow the hard-won stability to be disrupted again,” when taking questions during China’s National People’s Congress session in March 2017.20 “Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press,” March 8, 2017, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1444204.shtml.

Loss of key support for US interference

Since the inauguration of Rodrigo Duterte as President, the Philippines’policies toward China and the United States have witnessed major adjustments.Duterte has changed the provocative stance of his predecessor on the South China Sea issue. Despite support from the US, Japan and Australia for the socalled award on the South China Sea arbitration case, which revealed obvious injustice and political intentions, Duterte has repeatedly expressed goodwill to set the verdict aside and cooperate with China. In August 2016, former Philippine President Fidel Ramos, as Duterte’s special envoy, paid a visit to Hong Kong, in order to break ice in China-Philippines relations.

Duterte made China the destination for his first state visit outside ASEAN.During the visit, the two sides reached important consensus on the South China Sea issue, and decided not to let the disputes kidnap their bilateral relations.China and the Philippines reiterated that “contentious issues are not the sum total of the bilateral relationship,” and reaffirmed the importance of “addressing their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned.” The two sides also explored the possibility of establishing a bilateral consultation mechanism, and made commitment to“exercising self-restraint in the conduct of activities in the South China Sea that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability.”21 “Joint Statement of China and the Philippines,” October 21, 2016, http://english.gov.cn/news/international_exchanges/2016/10/21/content_281475471607490.htm. In May 2017, the first meeting of China-Philippines Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea was held in Guiyang, which materialized the important consensus reached the year before and established an institutional platform for related issues between the two countries. During Premier Li Keqiang’s official visit to the Philippines in November 2017, the two governments issued a joint statement affirming that “contentious maritime issues are not the sum total of the China-Philippines bilateral relationship,” and agreed to “continue discussions on confidence-building measures to increase mutual trust and confidence.”22 “Joint Statement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,” November 16, 2017, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1511299.shtml.

In terms of policy toward the US, the Duterte government has changed the Philippines’ over-reliance on the alliance with the US as practiced by the previous administration, and reassessed the status quo of US-Philippines security cooperation. The Obama administration’s criticism of Duterte for his anti-drug operations and subsequent suspension of aid further caused a strong reaction by the Philippine government.

In view of the Philippines’ reluctance to act as a pawn of the United States in the South China Sea disputes, the think tank CSIS has suggested that the US government encourage Japan and Australia, another two US regional allies,to intensify their coordination with the US in this regard, so as to increase the costs of China’s actions in the South China Sea.23 Amy Searight and Geoffrey Hartman, “The South China Sea-Some Fundamental Strategic Principles.” However, as neither Japan nor Australia are parties of the South China Sea disputes, and neither country is an ASEAN member, it is inappropriate for them to directly voice their opinions on the South China Sea issue, and therefore it becomes difficult for them to influence ASEAN’s position on the disputes.

本文的仿真实验中SN=50,问题维度分别采用了D=30、100,蜜源更新限制阈值limit=SN×D,函数的最大评估次数MAX_FES=5000×D。 accept值表示每个函数每次运行结束后所能接受的值,若运行结束后的最优值小于该值,则表示运行成功。SR%表示函数运行的成功率,即运行结束后的最优值小于accept值的次数,除以总运行次数所得到的值,该值可评价算法的鲁棒性。AVEN表示各个函数达到accept值所消耗的平均函数评估次数,该值可评估函数的收敛速度,值越小表明收敛速度越快。若全部运行次数均未达到accept值则视为NA。

China’s strategic initiative and restriction of US involvement

China has drawn a red line regarding the South China Sea issue and conveyed the message clearly to the Trump administration to avoid strategic miscalculation by the United States. As declared by China, the South China Sea islands are the inherent territory of China and it is absolutely normal to deploy necessary national defense facilities there. Such deployment will not change in the face of US objections. The Trump administration is unable to utilize the South China Sea disputes to curb China’s rise.

In the meantime, China attaches great importance to the overall situation of China-US relations. The South China Sea issue is by no means a problem between China and the US. China has maintained communication with the Trump administration through various channels to make the US side realize that“no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation” is the basis for China-US relations and serves the interests of both countries. China will continue to promote cooperation with the US, particularly in creating more opportunities for bilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.

Furthermore, China has been strengthening efforts to guide public opinion and expose the essence of the “freedom of navigation” presented by the US.Chinese academics have been pointing out the difference between the concept of “freedom of navigation” in international law and in the US context on multiple international platforms, revealing that the US is in fact using it as a pretext to strengthen military presence in the South China Sea and challenge the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the international maritime order.

Conclusion

The South China Sea issue has become an intractable factor in China-US relations. With the development of China’s power and influence, China and the US will continue to compete in the South China Sea. Under the Trump administration, it is almost a foregone conclusion that the US will continue to meddle in the South China Sea disputes. Although risks of policy miscalculation do exist, Trump’s South China Sea policy is expected to maintain its overall stability and rationality as the US does not want to provoke a conflict that may eventually lead to war.

China will adhere to its bottom-line thinking in the face of the US policy.On one hand, it will continue to properly handle the disputes with the parties directly involved, actively communicate with the ASEAN and other regional powers, promote maritime cooperation, build mutual trust and strive to achieve a favorable South China Sea situation. China is also willing to take this as the basis to manage differences with the US and jointly play an active role in the peace and stability of the South China Sea. On the other hand, China will always prepare for the worst and are ready to face up to evolving changes in the South China Sea.

Su Xiaohui
《China International Studies》2018年第2期文献

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