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The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor:Content, Motivation and Prospects

更新时间:2016-07-05

The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) is a collaborative vision shared by India and Japan to create a growth corridor and industrial network connecting Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and Africa across the Indo-Pacific region. Once it was raised, the AAGC was tagged as aiming at “countering the Belt and Road (the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative),”1 Manas Dasgupta, “OBOR Counter? Modi for Asia-Africa Corridor,” May 23, 2017, http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/obor-counter-modi-for-asia-africa-corridor/411899.html; Sudip Bhattacharyya,“The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor Is the Answer to the OBOR,” June 22, 2017, http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-the-asia-africa-growth-corridor-is-the-answer-to-obor-2479792; Titli Basu, “Thinking Africa:India, Japan, and the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor,” June 03, 2017, http://thediplomat.com/2017/06/thinkingafrica-india-japan-and-the-asia-africa-growth-corridor; Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “Pushing Back against China’s One Belt One Road, India, Japan Build Strategic ‘Great Wall’,” Economic Times, May 16, 2017. as there is a high level of overlapping in geographic coverage and cooperation fields between the AAGC and the Belt and Road Initiative. What’s more, the AAGC came out less than ten days after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi refused to send delegates to the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing.Therefore, in order to promote the Belt and Road Initiative across this region,it is necessary to evaluate of the motivation behind the AAGC, as well as its prospects, so as to properly deal with possible competition originating from it.

Content of the Proposed Asia-Africa Growth Corridor

On May 23, 2017, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared that “India,the United States and Japan are cooperating to support the development of Africa” and he had “fully discussed with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on this issue.” He then stated India and Japan would jointly develop an Asia-Africa Growth Corridor and a vision document of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor Partnership for Sustainable and Innovative Development was drawn up.2 “PM’s Address at the Inauguration of the Annual Meeting of the African Development Bank,”Government of India, May 23, 2017, http://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/pms-address-at-theinauguration-of-the-annual-meeting-of-the-african-development-bank/?comment=disable. In the document, which was jointly produced by three think tanks,namely the Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS),the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), and the Institute of Developing Economies-Japan External Trade Organization (IDEJETRO), it is pointed out that the AAGC will be instrumental in creating new production channels, expanding and deepening existing value chains, ensuring economic and technical cooperation for enhancing capacities, facilitating a greater flow of people between the two continents, and achieving sustainable growth over the longer term. The AAGC will be developed through quality infrastructure and complemented by digital and regulatory connectivity.3 Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS), Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), Institute of Developing Economies-Japan External Trade Organization(IDE-JETRO), Asia Africa Growth Corridor: Partnership for Sustainable and Innovative Development, A Vision Document, pp. 3-4. Although no detailed implementation procedures have been made public, based on official documents released by governments of India and Japan, as well as the research findings of the think tanks concerned, the main content and features of this initiative can be concluded as below:

Geographically, the AAGC covers the Indo-Pacific region, with special emphasis on “Maritime Asia” and Africa. The AAGC claims to promote integration between Asia and Africa across the Pacific and Indian Oceans.However, such a broad geographic coverage would increase the difficulty of strategic coordination between Japan and India, and might obscure the distribution of strategic resources and make it hard to achieve the two countries’interests. Judging from the present situation, Maritime Asia and Africa are the priority areas for Japan and India in their efforts to build the AAGC.

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Maritime Asia refers to the maritime region extending from Northeast Asia, across Southeast Asia and South Asia to West Asia. During the past years,with the growing importance of sea lane security in these regions, which seems to have become more vulnerable, the maritime security concerns of Japan and India have been increasing with the intensifying disputes over maritime rights and interests in the Asia-Pacific region, and these intensifying concerns have driven them to enhance maritime security cooperation. Although there is not much about Maritime Asia in the Vision Document, Maritime Asia is indeed the key field for these two countries’ strategic coordination based on the designs and practices of the two countries. In fact, before the AAGC was proposed, Japan and India had already started or were going to start cooperation on multiple projects including Trincomalee in Sri Lanka,the Chabahar port in Iran and the Dawei port in Myanmar, as well as in developing the Lakshadweep and Andaman and Nicobar islands in India. Since the Vision Document was released, cooperation between the two countries has further deepened: for one thing, the progress China has made in port and pier building in Maritime Asia has intensified India’s worries about so-called China’s String of Pearls strategy, while Japan also fears that China will jeopardize the maritime order. The two countries believe it is a must for them to jointly act to counter China’s “dominance”; for another the “maritime awareness” has become more significant in India’s construction of its national strategy, plus Japan is also pushing ahead with what it calls its “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.” These factors have encouraged their cooperation under the banner of two “maritime democracies.”

Among the four pillars in the Vision Document, quality infrastructure,institutional connectivity, and people-to-people partnerships can all be put into the category of connectivity. The three of them separately correspond to physical, institutional and people-to-people connectivity. Physical connectivity covers transportation and other basic infrastructure construction.Here transportation refers to highways, railways, airports, ports and urban transportation. Japan regards urban development as one of the key priorities in its efforts to promote the development of Africa.7 Japan’s African strategy concentrates on three important areas including the Mombasa/Northern corridor, Nacala corridor, and the growth area in West Africa; resources and energy development (such as geothermal energy and efficient power generation); and urban development like city transportation. See Titli Basu, “Thinking Africa: India, Japan, and the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor.” Other basic infrastructure includes Electricity (smart grids), telecommunications, postal services and other service facilities. Institutional connectivity focuses on the coordination between development strategies and working procedures, such as partnership in the International Solar Alliance and trade and investment facilitation mechanisms. Japan and India share the desire to further promote cooperation and collaboration in Africa in line with the priority measures identified through the India-Japan Dialogue on Africa, the India-Africa Forum Summit(IAFS) and TICAD.8 “India-Japan Joint Statement during visit of Prime Minister of Japan to India: Toward a Free, Open and Prosperous Indo-Pacific,” September 14, 2017, http://www.mea.gov.in/incoming-visit-detail.htm?28946/IndiaJapan+Joint+Statement+during+visit+of+Prime+Minister+of+Japan+to+India+September+14+2017. People-to-people exchanges include tourism, education,knowledge promotion and people-to-people communication. This multidimensional connectivity is designed to achieve multiple goals in five aspects,including effective mobilization of financial resources; building alignment with socio-economic development and development strategies of partner countries and regions; the application of high-quality standards in terms of compliance with international standards established to mitigate environmental and social impacts; the provision of quality of infrastructure taking into account aspects of economic efficiency and durability, inclusiveness, safety and disaster-resilience,sustainability as well as convenience and amenities; and contributions to the local society and economy.9 Asia Africa Growth Corridor: Partnership for Sustainable and Innovative Development, A Vision Document, p.4.

The AAGC stresses a development-oriented vision and regional connectivity. The Vision Document outlines four pillars for the AAGC. These four pillars are development and cooperation projects, quality infrastructure and institutional connectivity, enhancing capacity and skills, and people-topeople partnerships.5 Asia Africa Growth Corridor: Partnership for Sustainable and Innovative Development, A Vision Document, p.8. For the AAGC, development and cooperation projects are the main leverage, building quality infrastructure and institutional connectivity are the practical focus, while enhancing capacity and skills is the fundamental basis and people-to-people partnerships build a foundation of mutual understanding.

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Japan and India have been continuously upgrading Africa’s status in their diplomatic network with the realistic goal to advance complementarity of their policy resources. Ties between these two countries and Africa stretch back a long time. After its independence, India endeavored to support African countries’ fight for their own independence and regarded Africa as an important partner in the Non-Alliance Movement. Similarly, Japan initiated the TICAD in 1993. However, the two countries did not dedicate a lot of resources to Africa at first. Since Shinzo Abe and Narendra Modi took office, they have put a lot of emphasis on their governments’ diplomacy towards Africa. For instance, the Abe administration has made Africa the “new frontier” of Japanese diplomacy,and Abe “travelled no fewer than three times to the African Continent, an unprecedented number for a Japanese Prime Minister.”23 Céline Pajon, Japan’s Security Policy in Africa: The Dawn of a Strategic Approach?, Institute français des relations internationals (Ifri), May 2017, pp. 5-6. In 2014, Japan decided to hold the TICAD every three years instead of five. And it would be held alternately in both Japan and Africa, instead of only in Japan. The Modi government held the third India-Africa Forum Summit with a far higher format,bigger scale and richer outcomes.24 The first India-Africa Forum Summit was held in New Delhi in 2008 with only 14 countries’representatives present. The second India-Africa Forum Summit was held in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia and only 15 countries sent officials to attend. The third summit invited 54 countries, among which leaders of 41 countries participated this event. Modi announced his SAGAR proposal during his visit to Seychelles and Mauritius in 2015. In 2016, Modi visited the African continent, and this was first visit an Indian Prime Minister has paid to Southeast Africa since 1982.

The reasons why Japan and India have made people-to-people partnerships a key field in the AAGC are as follows: First, emphasizing people-to-people interactions makes it easy to claim the moral high ground and ease other countries’ worries. Second, people-to-people partnerships are consistent with the respective economic development strategies of Japan and India, who would benefit from the AAGC. Third, as it echoes the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Agenda 2063 of the African Union,strengthening people-to-people interactions could help to gain more support for the AAGC. This logic can be observed from the government agencies that took part in outlining the AAGC plan: on the Indian side, it is the Development Partnership Administration Agency, the Policy Planning and Research Division, and the East Asia Division under the Ministry of External Affairs,as well as the Department of Commerce under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, while Japan’s Trade Policy Bureau at the Ministry of Economy,Trade and Industry participated in the process. Apart from this, the three think tanks6 The RIS is a policy research institute under the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. Members of its governing council are high-ranking officials from the Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry of Finance,Ministry of Commerce and Industry and Ministry of Science and Technology, etc. The RIS acts as the main consulting institute when the Indian government is promoting policies on ASEAN-India connectivity, South Asia regional integration, and South-south cooperation. Also, the Indian government tends to consult with the RIS before signing economic cooperation agreements with other countries. The ERIA was established in 2008 and is the most important policy advisory institute for regional integration in ASEAN. Although its headquarters is located at the ASEAN Secretariat, Japan nevertheless has great influence. IDE-JETRO was established in 1960. Its conducts research on economic, social and political issues in developing countries/areas, and provides policy advice to the Japanese government in its economic and trade cooperation with foreign countries. mentioned above also work specifically on regional economic and trade cooperation and connectivity, and all of them are closely related to the governments of Japan and India.

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Africa is another key area for the AAGC. In the Vision Document, many development and cooperation programs focus on Africa, specifically arguing for the complementarity of India and Japan in Africa. Although the United States considers the Indo-Pacific region as stretching from the west coast of India to the western shores of the United States,4 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, p.46. according to Japan and India, Africa(especially East Africa) should also be included as part of the Indo-Pacific region. The important status of Africa can be seen from the occasions on which the strategies were announced. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe unveiled Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy at the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the AAGC at the annual meetings of the African Development Bank. There are great prospects for Africa as a key region of the AAGC, since the continent is rich in natural resources and has great market potential. In addition, the many African countries which account for more than a quarter of United Nations membership are a potential “voting bloc” in the UN General Assembly. As Africa’s status appears more and more evident in the economic, diplomatic and even security strategies of Japan and India, it is in these two country’s interests to increase their strategic inputs with regard to Africa.

The AAGC is driven by perceptions and may fail to carry through despite a good start. Major powers tend to use perceptions as the first step of their diplomacy; sometimes these perceptions only appear in the leaders’speeches and even if reflected in their diplomatic practices there may be no systematic and normative strategic documents about these ideas. India’s Act East policy is one example of this phenomenon. The AAGC in large part is also driven by perceptions and ideas, which shows Japan and India’s strategic aspirations and capability to strengthen cooperation. There was once some news report saying that the final version of implementation plan for the AAGC would be published during Abe’s visit to India in September 2017.10 Neha Sinha, “Asia- Africa Growth Corridor: Can It Be a Game Changer?” June 5, 2017, http://www.vifindia.org/article/2017/june/05/asia-africa-growth-corridor-can-it-be-a-game-changer;Maulik Pathak, “India-Japan Partnership to Play Key Role in Asia-Africa Corridor,” May 25, 2017, http://www.livemint.com/Politics/gfSbaVJjfHuoUKPTMxrU8L/IndiaJapan-partnership-to-play-key-role-in-AsiaAfrica-corr.html. However,considering the broad coverage of this initiative and the many different fields it involves, Abe only emphasized that “they (Japan and India) welcome the deepening of their connectivity dialogue aimed at achieving concrete progress and decided to further accelerate such an initiative” and “the two prime ministers welcome the efforts to explore the development of industrial corridors and industrial network for the growth of Asia and Africa, which will benefit various stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region including Africa.”11 “India-Japan Joint Statement during the visit of Prime Minister of Japan to India: Toward a Free, Open and Prosperous Indo-Pacific,” September 14, 2017, https://newsroompost.com/347700/full-text-of-theindia-japan-joint-statement/. However, the two parties did not issue any policy paper.

According to the schedule set out in the Vision Document, a joint study team commissioned by the two governments is to conduct the preparation of Asia Africa Growth Corridor study between 20017-2018 and seek the advice of Japanese, Indian and African think tanks, and the final study report is due to be published in 2018.12 Asia Africa Growth Corridor: Partnership for Sustainable and Innovative Development, A Vision Document, p.16. Nevertheless, this final study report could probably be an implementation plan in the foreseeable future while there would be no stipulated time period for the AAGC itself. For one thing, this initiative covers such a broad geographic area and so many different cooperation fields that it is difficult to set a definite timetable for it; for another, the initiative itself is driven by perceptions and acts as a policy guideline for Japan and India, rather than some specific implementation schedule. In addition, the proposal and promotion of the AAGC itself is the outcome of geopolitical changes, hence Japan and India will not set a specific timetable to “trap themselves.”

Policy Motivation for the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor

The AAGC is neither an expedient plan, nor a baseless initiative that came out of nowhere. On the contrary, it is the outcome of the transition in domestic policies of Japan and India. Also, it has come out of the coordination of these two countries’ strategies from the perspectives of the Indo-Pacific region and suits both countries’ interests in tapping their complementarity and jointly exploring the opportunities presented by Africa’s development. This AACG initiative embodies their worries about China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its striving to be a maritime power.

China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific region has triggeredJapan and India’s strategic anxiety and catalyzed their joint promotion of the AAGC. Since China proposed the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013,China’s strategic interests and clout in the Indo-Pacific region have witnessed steady progress, which is manifested in the growing number of countries which are participating in and benefiting from Belt and Road projects, and their understanding of and support for a series of concepts and mechanisms promoted by China. In this context, Japan and India’s strategic anxiety toward China has intensified, fearing that the latter will destabilize the existing regional order. Over the past few years, both Japan and India have put forward some initiatives separately to offset China’s Belt and Road, claiming to provide regional countries with alternative choices besides the Chinese one. For example, the Partnership for Quality Infrastructure is the Japanese government’s response to what it considers China’s one-sided emphasis on quantity at the expense of quality in infrastructure investment, an approach that in Japan’s opinion has mired the recipient countries in debt. Under the initiative, Japan has been competing with China for infrastructure projects. In addition, Japan has also touted the so-called “rule of law at sea” and proposed a “rules-based maritime order,” criticizing China’s “assertive” maritime security policies. India has similarly put forward the Monsoon Project and the Sagarmala Project, and raised concerns about, even objections to, China’s port construction in Sri Lanka, its free trade negotiations with the Maldives and especially the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, among other Belt and Road projects. At the same time, India has been investing more efforts into the revival of the identity and community of the Indian Ocean,34 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Foreign Secretary’s Address to the Indian Ocean Conference,” September 1, 2017, http://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/28909/Foreign+Secretarys+Address+to+the+Indian+Ocean+Conference+Colombo. in order to consolidate its dominance in the region. In the eyes of the US scholar J.Berkshire Miller, “One reason the two countries are coming together is a common strategic anxiety about China’s rise, particularly its foreign policy ambitions in Asia. For them, Beijing’s maritime assertiveness in the East and South China Seas, as well as the Indian Ocean region, and its push to expand its geopolitical influence beyond East Asia through its Belt and Road Initiative and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are particularly alarming. India and Japan, in response, have come to share a sense of purpose in promoting the current order in the region, which is based on transparent institutions, good governance, and international law and benefits them by ensuring secure supply chains and fair access to resources.”35 J. Berkshire Miller, “How Abe and Modi Can Save the Indo-Pacific: Asia’s Most Strategic Friendship,”Foreign Affairs, November 15, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/2017-11-15/how-abeand-modi-can-save-indo-pacific.

In August 2007, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe delivered a speech entitled “The Confluence of the Two Seas” to the Indian Parliament, claiming that “The Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity. A ‘broader Asia’ that broke away geographical boundaries is now beginning to take on a distinct form,” “Japanese diplomacy is now promoting various concepts in a host of different areas so that a region called ‘the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ will be formed along the outer rim of the Eurasian continent,” “the strategic global partnership of Japan and India is pivotal for such pursuits to be successful ... incorporating the United States of America and Australia.”14 “Confluence of the Two Seas,” Speech by Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html. After he took office for the second time in late December 2012, Abe proposed the concept of a “Democratic Security Diamond,” saying that “Japan is a mature maritime democracy, and its choice of close partners should reflect that fact. I envisage a strategy whereby Australia, India, Japan, and the US state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the western Pacific….India deserves greater emphasis.”15 Shinzo Abe, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond,” Project Syndicate, December 27, 2012. Since then, Japan’s policies toward India, Southeast Asia and even Africa have all centered on the vision of building a Indo-Pacific order more beneficial for Japan. At the sixth TICAD in 2016,Abe unveiled the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy,” claiming that “Japan bears the responsibility of fostering the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and of Asia and Africa into a place that values freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy, free from force or coercion, and making it prosperous,” “Let us make this stretch that is from Asia to Africa a main artery for growth and prosperity.”16 “Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development,” August 27, 2016, http://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html.

India published its first-ever maritime strategy, the Indian Maritime Doctrine, in 2004, pointing out that “the focus of global maritime affairs has transferred from the Atlantic-Pacific area to the Indo-Pacific Ocean.”17 Indian Maritime Doctrine, New Delhi: Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence 2004, pp. 65-67. Thereafter, Indian leaders have used the term “Indo-Pacific” on several occasions, yet there was no officially stated Indo-Pacific strategy. Since Modi became prime minister, he has broadened the strategic and diplomatic view of the Indo-Pacific region and has been trying to construct an Indo-Pacific strategy based on the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific. Therefore, he first upgraded India’s East Asia strategy from the Look East policy to Act East policy, then proposed a Think West strategy for the western Indian Ocean and the concept of SAGAR (a Hindi word meaning Security and Growth for All in the Region).India’s areas of interest in its 2015 Maritime Security Strategy have clearly expanded compared with the 2007 version, with its primary interests focusing on the northwestern Indian Ocean (Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden,Red Sea) and newly covering the southwestern Indian Ocean (island nations in the Ocean and countries along Africa’s eastern coast), as well as the Straits of Malacca, Singapore, Sunda and Lombok. The secondary maritime interests are topped by the Southeastern Indian Ocean (including the sea lane to the Pacific Ocean) and covers for the first time the East China Sea, the Mediterranean Sea,Africa’s western coast and the Antarctica.18 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy, Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2015, p. 32. It is most obvious in the new Indian Maritime Security Strategy that the geographic scope has expanded across the entire Indo-Pacific region.19 Satu Limaye, Weighted West, Focused on the Indian Ocean and Cooperating across the Indo-Pacific:The Indian Navy’s New Maritime Strategy, Capabilities, and Diplomacy, Center for Naval Analysis, April 2017, p. 16.

When promoting their own Indo-Pacific policies, Japan and India both regard each other as important partners and their strategic cooperation has been continuously deepened. In 2014 when Modi took power, he made Japan his first destination outside India’s immediate neighborhood in South Asia, and during his visit the two countries decided to upgrade their bilateral relations to a “special strategic and global partnership.” In 2015, Abe paid a another visit to India and both sides announced the “Japan and India Vision 2025: Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working Together for the Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World.”20 This statement is recognized as the guide for the new era in Japan-India relations. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/data.html. Two years later, Japan and India issued another joint statement named “Toward a Free,Open and Prosperous Indo-Pacific.” In all these documents, Japan and India have reiterated their strategic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, especially coordination between Japan’s Free and Open India and Pacific Strategy and India’s Act East policy. It was based on this consensus that the AAGC was formed. In the Japan and India Vision 2025, the two countries “reiterated their unwavering commitment to realize a peaceful, open, equitable, stable and rulebased order in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond” and “pledged to advance industrial networks and regional value chains with open, fair and transparent business environment in the region.”21 “Joint Statement on India and Japan Vision 2025: Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World,” December 12, 2015, http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/26176/Joint_Statement_on_India_and_Japan_Vision_2025_Special_Strategic_and_Global_Partnership_Working_Together_for_Peace_and_Prosperity_of_the_IndoPacific_R. In 2016 when Modi visited Japan, both countries stressed their aspirations to “improve connectivity between Asia and Africa, through realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific region” and “to promote cooperation and collaboration in Africa, with the objective to synergize their efforts and explore specific joint projects including in the areas of training and capacity building, health, infrastructure and connectivity. In this regard,they also expressed their intention to work jointly and cooperatively with the international community to promote the development of industrial corridors and industrial network in Asia and Africa.”22 “India-Japan Joint Statement during the Visit of the Indian Prime Minister to Japan,” November 11,2016, http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/27599/IndiaJapan+Joint+Statement+during+the+visit+of+Prime+Minister+to+Japan. Therefore, the AAGC is the natural outcome of the two countries’ efforts to synergize their individual Indo-Pacific strategies.

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While the AAGC is intended to compete with the Belt and Road, the possibility of cooperation cannot be ruled out. As concerns about China are an important driver of the AAGC, the advance of the initiative will inevitably have competitive effects on China. Despite China’s reiterations it is committed to a path of peaceful development, as well as its commitment to fostering a new type of international relations and building a community with a shared future for mankind, which was delivered at the 19th CPC National Congress, the Japanese and Indian governments have not given any positive response. The perception of China challenging the existing international order has become a strategic consensus for the two countries. In Japan’s opinion, “China’s economic expansion in Africa is advancing at the expense of Human Rights and good governance, and is used to gather support for Beijing’s core interests (from cross-Straits relations to expansion in the South China Sea) and revisionist international agenda.”39 Céline Pajon, Japan’s Security Policy in Africa: The Dawn of a Strategic Approach? p.10. Therefore, the AAGC, which provides an alternative to hedge against the Belt and Road, will not be easily abandoned by the two countries. The United States, while actively encouraging closer Japan-India relations, has also criticized China in its new National Security Strategy: “China is using economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda.China’s infrastructure investments and trade strategies reinforce its geopolitical aspirations.”40 The White House, Céline Pajon, Japan’s Security Policy in Africa: The Dawn of a Strategic Approach?p.10. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p.46.

The AAGC serves to realize the policy goals of the two countries toward Africa. On the one hand, it accords with both the development demands of Africa and the economic diplomacy of Japan and India toward the continent.In its Infrastructure System Export Strategy of 2013, Japan announced its goal to achieve 30 trillion yen in infrastructure-related orders to Japanese companies by 2020. In his speech at the banquet of the 21st International Conference on the Future of Asia held in Tokyo in May 2015, Abe expressed Japan’s intention to “spread high-quality and innovative infrastructure throughout Asia.”27 “The Future of Asia: Be Innovative,” Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Banquet of the 21st International Conference on the Future of Asia, May 21, 2015, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201505/0521foaspeech.html. Abe further proposed the Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure at the 2016 G7 Ise-Shima summit, where he pledged to provide financing of approximately US$200 billion as the target for the next five years to infrastructure projects across the world, with the targeted area expanding from Asia to the whole world (e.g. Russia and Africa) and the scope expanding to a wide range of infrastructure that includes natural resources and energy (e.g. oil, gas, hospitals).28 The G7 Ise-Shima Summit, “Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure,” http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2016/pdf/0523_01a.pdf. In this policy context, the focus of Japan’s Africa diplomacy has gradually shifted to infrastructure construction from merely resource exploitation. At the TICAD in 2016, Abe promised that Japan, for a period of three years from 2016 to 2018, would invest approximately US$30 billion in Africa under public-private partnerships, with US$10 billion of the amount to be invested in quality infrastructure.29 “Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI) ,” August 2, 2016, http://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html., 2015, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-Africa-summit-Read-full-text-of-PM-Narendra-Modis-speech/articleshow/49577890.cms. India has also sought to enhance its assistance for Africa’s development projects by tapping its unique advantages of geographical and interpersonal ties. At the third India-Africa Forum Summit in 2015, Modi announced that India would offer concessional credit of US$10 billion over the next five years and a grant assistance of US$600 million (to include an India-Africa Development Fund of $100 million).30 “India-Africa Summit: Read Full Text of PM Narendra Modi’s Speech,” The Times of India, October The framework for India-Africa strategic cooperation“Partners in Progress: Towards a Dynamic and Transformative Development Agenda,” which was adopted at the summit, also emphasized the synergies of shared core objectives as defined in Africa’s Agenda 2063 and the Indian government’s development priorities.31 “Partners in Progress: Towards a Dynamic and Transformative Development Agenda, India-Africa Framework for Strategic Cooperation,” October 29, 2015, http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/25981_framework.pdf.

On the other hand, the AAGC is conducive to reinforcing the complementary advantages of Japan and India’s policy resources. With a large number of expatriates in Africa, India has particularly prominent influence in the politics and economy of island countries in the western Indian Ocean, 68 percent of the Mauritian people are of Indian origin, and the approximately 2.8 million Indian people now living on the African continent have greatly facilitated Indian enterprises’ interpersonal network building and integration into the local society.32 Harry G. Broadman, Africa’s Silk Road: China and India’s New Economic Frontier, Washington, DC:World Bank, 2007, p.23, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/7186. Among the entrepreneurs of Indian descent in Africa,the percentages of those with Indian and African nationalities are respectively 45 percent and 48 percent, while the proportions of those with Chinese and African nationalities, among the businessmen of Chinese origin in Africa, are respectively 93 percent and 4 percent, which shows the former’s high level of integration into local society. Japan, despite its financial and technological advantages, lacks an understanding of Africa’s cultural environment and market operations. Although as early as 2010, Japan and India established a dialogue mechanism on Africa-related issues, which has since become an important platform for the two countries to coordinate their Africa policies.In the Vision Document for the AAGC, the complementary role of India and Japan is specifically discussed. For example, India, through the Pan Africa e-Network and the India-Africa Forum Summit, has a comparative edge in capacity building and developing a structured engagement with Africa,but its development partnerships in Africa are confronting the challenges of resource constraints. Japan, meanwhile, has expertise in capital, technology,management, and R&D.33 Asia Africa Growth Corridor: Partnership for Sustainable and Innovative Development, A Vision Document, pp. 5-6.

The strategic understanding between Japan and India has upgraded to strategic coordination, which can be clearly observed from the AAGC.In recent years, it has become a strategic consensus that the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean have turned into one integrated zone with geopolitical significance.13 Zhao Qinghai, “The Concept of Indo-Pacific and Its Implications for China,” Contemporary International Relations, No.7, 2013. As two important powers in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan and India have been steadily enlarging their bilateral cooperation under the Indo-Pacific framework, and they have even actively planned for multilateral cooperation with the United States and Australia.

Even though the governments of Japan and India do not and will not explicitly claim that the AAGC is targeted at China, a look at the interactions between the two countries in recent years shows that China is an important factor in Japan and India’s considerations when promoting the AAGC. First,their shared concerns about the rise of China have accelerated their cooperation.Out of fear that China will challenge the existing order and anxiety that the United States’ capability and commitment to safeguarding the regional order is at stake, Japan and India, as two major powers in the Indo-Pacific, have reinforced their cooperation against China. “The rise of China is considered by Japanese policymakers as presenting the greatest systemic challenge the country faces in the coming years … China is thus a structural factor in Japanese foreign policy, even when considering its diplomacy vis-à-vis Africa.”36 Céline Pajon, Japan’s Security Policy in Africa: The Dawn of a Strategic Approach? p.10. Take the 2016 TICAD, for example. Unsatisfied with some African countries that had lent support to China’s position on the South China Sea issue, Japan promoted the incorporation of “maintaining a rules-based maritime order in accordance with the principles of international law” into the TICAD VI Nairobi Declaration. 37 “Advancing Africa’s Sustainable Development Agenda: TICAD Partnership for Prosperity,” TICAD VI Nairobi Declaration, August 28, 2016, http://www.mofa.go.jp/af/af1/page3e_000543.html. Second, Japan and India intend to shape the AAGC to rival the Belt and Road Initiative. Although similar considerations to offset the influence of the Chinese initiative also underlie the multiple proposals the two countries launched in previous years, the Belt and Road has greatly advanced, independent of Japan and India’s will, and gained increasingly broader international attraction. Given this, the two countries hope to integrate their comparative advantages and offer regional countries an alternative to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative.

采取SPSS16.0软件对整理后的数据做进一步的描述统计分析、独立样本T检验、相关分析以及一元回归分析。

首先,根据网络中UAV的数量K将L个地面移动IoT设备分为K簇.设移动IoT设备的水平面投影坐标为υi(xi,yi),i∈L,设备分簇后各簇中心的水平面投影坐标为μj(xj,yj),j∈K,则可用受约束的K-mean聚类方法实现对L个地面移动IoT设备的分簇.

Prospects and Implications of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor

The specific design of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor and detailed measures for its implementation are yet to be released, but despite various obstacles that lie ahead, the AAGC is bound to advance in the long term and impact on China’s Belt and Road Initiative to a certain extent.

The possibility of the AAGC’s final materialization, characterized by a model of “led by Japan and India and joined by the rest,” cannot be underestimated. As mentioned earlier, there are profound geo-political and geo-economic drivers for the two countries to promote the AAGC. Both Japan and India, in a period of strongman leadership, have great enthusiasm for advancing their external strategies. Particularly since China is successfully advancing and further developing its Belt and Road Initiative, they have felt increasingly great pressure and thus set high expectations for the AAGC,which they hope will rival and undercut China’s Belt and Road. In the first half of 2017, the Research and Information System for Developing Countries(RIS), the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)and the Institute of Developing Economies of the Japan External Trade Organization (IDE-JETRO), conducted a feasibility study for the AAGC under the sponsorship of India’s External Affairs Ministry and Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. The thinks tanks held two Track 1.5 roundtables on the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor and Asia-Africa connectivity in January and April 2017, respectively in New Delhi and Jakarta, and scholars from South Africa, Mozambique, Singapore and Australia attended the second conference. The vision document was unveiled at the annual meetings of African Development Bank in late May 2017. During Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to India in September, the India-Japan Economic Forum was held, during which there was a session to discuss the AAGC Vision Document and India-Japan cooperation. It is obvious that relevant research on the AAGC is in progress and the AAGC has become a key issue for the two governments.

In addition, more countries are likely to participate in the initiative. Apart from India and Japan, South Africa, Mozambique, Indonesia, Singapore and Australia sent representatives for the consultation process on the Document.38 Neha Sinha, “Asia- Africa Growth Corridor: Can It Be a Game Changer?” Vivekananda International Foundation, June 5, 2017, http://www.vifindia.org/article/2017/june/05/asia-africa-growth-corridor-can-itbe-a-game-changer. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi also chose such multilateral occasions as the African Development Bank Annual Meetings to announce the AAGC and test the water. Moreover, given US President Donald Trump reiterated Japan’s proposal of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” in November 2017, and the harsh criticism of China in the new US National Security Strategy is consistent with Japan and India’s concerns, the US will encourage the two countries to advance the initiative even in the absence of active participation. In fact, the US has been seeking to spare its commitment to regional affairs and realize its objective of “America First” by pushing in-depth strategic cooperation among Indo-Pacific countries(especially Japan and India). For the countries along the routes, the AAGC gives them more development opportunities and more flexible policy options, and thus there is no need to oppose such an initiative. Furthermore, the several influential regional platforms (such as the Asian Development Bank and the Indian Ocean Rim Association) will facilitate the implementation of the AAGC.

Several considerations underlie Japan and India’s upgrade of diplomacy toward the African continent. First, political interests. Both countries have been anxious to become permanent members of the United Nations Security Council by taking advantage of the reform of the United Nations. In this process, African countries, due to the number of their votes, have a significant effect. The G4,a four-nation bloc composed of Japan, India, Germany and Brazil, indicated at a joint press statement after a foreign ministers’ meeting on United Nations reform in September 2014 that, “Since support from two-thirds of the member states (129 countries) are necessary for promotion of the reform, the G4 nations will approach and encourage reform-oriented member states, including African countries (54 countries).”25 “Ministerial-Level Meeting of G4 (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/unp/page18e_000104.html. This proposal has been continuously reiterated in recent G4 foreign ministers’ meetings. Second, economic benefits. Although the economic performance of African countries is worse than expected due to the declining price of international bulk commodities and the political turmoil in West Asia and North Africa, their growth rates are still higher than the global average. The McKinsey Global Institute, in its 2016 report Lions on the Move II: Realizing the Potential of Africa’s Economies, pointed out that: “The region is expected to enjoy the fastest urbanization of any region in the world, and to have a larger workforce than either India or China by 2034. It also has a huge opportunity to leverage internet and mobile technology, and still has abundant resources.”26 Mckinsey Global Institute, Lions on the Move II: Realizing the Potential of Africa’s Economies,September 2016, pp. 5-7. Third, it involves security interests. Some African countries have been faced with the risks of terrorism, corruption and even turmoil. To protect their overseas interests on the continent, Japan and India, as major active players in African peacekeeping, have been participating in UN peacekeeping operations by means of financial and personnel input.

The AAGC is likely to collide with some Belt and Road projects in its implementation. Since Japan launched its Partnership for Quality Infrastructure,it has been competing with China on infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia.In practical terms, this has had negative effects on some Chinese projects.Similarly, India has also been interfering with and obstructing China’s Belt and Road projects in South Asia by wielding its influence on its South Asian neighbors (such as Sri Lanka and Nepal), causing some of the projects to be delayed or even suspended. Provided Japan and India are able to integrate their respective policy resources and comparative advantages, they will be a potent competitor for China for regional development projects.

That being said, the possibility of cooperation between the AAGC and the Belt and Road Initiative cannot be simply ruled out. First, the geographical coverage and the scope of the two initiatives largely overlap. The possibility exists for China, Japan and India to jointly advance some development projects,especially in low-sensitivity areas that concern people’s livelihoods, such as agriculture, medicine and disaster relief. Second, without appropriate guidance,the competition or even antagonism between the two initiatives is not in the interests of both sides. A recent Kyodo News report, citing officials from the Japanese government, revealed that Prime Minister Abe considers it an urgency to improve relations with China. Abe, according to the report, has basically decided to connect and advance its free and open Indo-Pacific strategy with China’s Belt and Road concept.41 “Abe Changes China Strategy, Considers Connection with the Belt and Road,” Kyodo News, December 18, 2017, http://china.kyodonews.net/news/2017/12/7d748322b8b0--.html. The same goes for China. If it could cooperate with Japan and India, the two significant powers in the region, the Belt and Road could be more effectively realized.

With multiple obstacles ahead, the AAGC will not advance smoothly.First, there is difficulty with policy integration between Japan and India.Despite intensified bilateral strategic coordination, the two countries are still at odds in many areas. For example, during the first Australia-India-Japan-US Consultations on the Indo-Pacific on November 12, 2017, there was a slight difference in the statements released by the four countries. The Indian statement did not mention freedom of navigation as did those of the United States, Japan and Australia, and modified the concept of free and open Indo-Pacific into “a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region.”42 “India-Australia-Japan-U.S. Consultations on Indo-Pacific,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/29110/IndiaAustraliaJapanUS_Consultations_on_IndoPacific_November_12_2017; “Australia-India-Japan-U.S. Consultations on the Indo-Pacific,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001789.html; “Australia-India-Japan-U.S. Consultations on the Indo-Pacific,” U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/11/275464.htm; “Australia-India-Japan-United States consultations on the Indo-Pacific,”Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, http://dfat.gov.au/news/media/Pages/ausindia-japan-us-consultations-on-the-indo-pacific.aspx.

Second, the capital needed for the AAGC construction is strained. In Japan, the budget for the Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2015 witnessed a decline for the 16th consecutive year. Although the spending picked up again in 2016 and 2017, the amount was still less than half the level in 1997. Considering the investment for infrastructure, with an annual quota of approximately US$13 billion prior to 2015, is only one of the core operations for the Asian Development Bank, the capital available falls far short of the global demands for infrastructure.43 Meng Xiaoxu, “Partnership for Quality Infrastructure: The Japanese Initiative and Its Prospects,”International Studies, No.3, 2017, p.83. Therefore, financial input from the private sector will be needed besides governmental investment and aid. However, given the long cycle and low rate of return of infrastructure investment, as well as the strong risk-averse preference of Japanese enterprises,it remains uncertain how much private capital will be attracted to the AAGC in the future.

另外,在每年汛期第一场暴雨后进行突击抢排换水。根据历年的水质监测报告,每年7月份的水质最差,其原因是夏收夏种后麦秸、油菜秸等有机腐蚀物,水稻田的大量化肥、农药残留物经过暴雨洗涤后汇集到河道内,造成面污染,每年汛期第一场暴雨后的大换水对改善内河水质的效果较为明显。

Last but not least, the coordination with other countries could also be a bottleneck for the AAGC. The first requirement is to win support from the United States. Looking back on the evolution of Japan-India relations, the two countries’ closer engagement is inseparable from the encouragement of the United States.44 Thomas F. Lynch III and James J. Przystup, “India-Japan Strategic Cooperation and Implications for U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region,” Strategic Perspectives, No. 24, Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2014, pp.5-6. While promoting Japan-India cooperation, the Trump administration has criticized in the new National Security Strategy that “Some Chinese practices undermine Africa’s long-term development by corrupting elites, dominating extractive industries, and locking countries into unsustainable and opaque debts and commitments.”45 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p.52. However, the document did not mention in the part concerning its Africa strategy how and to what extent the United States will participate in the AAGC. The second is to defuse China’s misgivings. With extensive interests on the African continent, China plays an important role in the broader Indo-Pacific region. Take direct investment for example. While the direct investment of Japan and India to Africa from 2009 to 2014 increased by 74.6 percent and 25 percent to reach US$10 billion and US$15 billion respectively, China’s input during the same period skyrocketed by 255.6 percent, hitting US$32 billion.46 John Aglionby and Leo Lewis, “Japan Looks to Boost Trade with Africa,” Financial Times, August 26,2016, https://www.ft.com/content/89e0c824-6ac4-11e6-a0b1-d87a9fea034f. Given this, it is unlikely Japan and India will be able to advance the AAGC without any consideration of China, and it is also in the two countries’ interests to avoid vicious competition with China.The third is to overcome investment risks in the host countries. The majority of Asian and African nations are developing countries, among which quite a few are blighted by corruption, terrorism and political turmoil. All these have added to the difficulty incentivizing Japanese and Indian private enterprises to participate in the AAGC.

Conclusion

The AAGC is becoming a major pivot for Japan-India strategic cooperation in Asia and Africa. Looking at the diplomatic adjustments of the two countries in recent years, the AAGC is far from simply an economic initiative, but a specific reflection of strengthened bilateral strategic coordination in the region. Even in the absence of an explicit and detailed implementation blueprint, Japan and India have invested enough political commitment and institutional preparations for the launching and advancing of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, which is manifested in the Japan-India Dialogue on Africa and the bilateral Special Strategic and Global Partnership, the India-Africa Forum Summit and India’s Act East strategy, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development,the Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure and Japan’s strategy for a“free and open Indo-Pacific.” Particularly, as the United States has adopted Japan’s proposal of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” and encouraged India to be a stronger strategic and defense partner, the cooperation between Japan and India on the strategic level will be given new impetus. Even though the specific planning for the AAGC has not yet been unveiled, and despite the multiple risks and challenges its implementation might encounter, the two countries’determination to advance the initiative will hardly be reversed.

While the competitive effects of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor on the Belt and Road should not be underestimated, China should avoid a zerosum mentality. On the contrary, it is necessary for China to closely follow the progress of the AAGC and the relevant consultations among the United States, Japan, India and Australia, so it can more actively enhance its policy communication with Japan and India, publicly voice its own concerns, and explore the possibility of cooperation between the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor and the Belt and Road Initiative.

对于O3前体物NO2,其日变化随呈现早晚双峰分布。受假期的影响,早高峰时间也推迟到100,此时NO2出现峰值。随后由于太阳辐射增强,臭氧前体物在光化学反应作用下不断被消耗,并在100达到最低点。此后,NO2浓度又逐渐回升,并在夜间凌晨出现第二高值点,这与晚高峰和夜间边界层高度较低、大气扩散条件差有关。1月20日~1月26日相比,NOx高值点均出现000及100左右。(见图7)

Lou Chunhao
《China International Studies》2018年第2期文献

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