Security Dilemma on the Korean Peninsula and the Way Out

The Korean Peninsula is where military forces and strategic weapons are most densely deployed. With the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) accelerating the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in recent years, the mutual deterrence between the DPRK and the alliance between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States has been escalating. Both sides have established strategic strike capabilities able to destroy each other.This has caused both sides to become increasingly locked in a security dilemma whereby greater investments in arms may only lead to greater security threats. As a result, tensions have escalated and the risk of war has increased. The only realistic path for escaping from this security dilemma is realizing a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula while establishing a permanent peace mechanism for the purpose of common security. The new concept of security in Asia, as advocated by President Xi Jinping, is therefore of great significance for breaking the security dilemma on the Korean Peninsula.

Ever-Increasing Strategic Arms Race

For over half a century since the armistice of the Korean War, both the DPRK and the ROK have maintained huge military expenditures for years on end and have preserved a relatively high global military strength in proportion to their respective populations.1 According to statistics from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the number of DPRK and ROK troops rank fifth and sixth respectively in the world, while the proportion of troops within their populations rank first and third respectively. Also, about 28,000 US ground,marine and air personnel are stationed in the ROK, which has a size of only 100,000 square kilometers. At present, one basic characteristic of the security situation on the Korean Peninsula is that both the DPRK and the US-ROK alliance are racing to enhance their strategic strike capabilities to destroy the other, resulting in rising threats to both sides. This is manifested in the continuous intensification and expansion of the strategic arms race between the two sides.

First, the DPRK nuclear issue has undergone a qualitative change from inter-Korean mutual deterrence to DPRK-US mutual assurance of nuclear destruction. After years of massive investment and multiple ballistic missile tests, the DPRK has obtained ballistic missile forces that cover a number of models with different ranges, including intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of striking the US homeland. After successfully testing a Hwasong-14 ballistic missile, the DPRK’s top leader Kim Jong-un was reported to have claimed that all the US mainland is within the striking range of the DPRK’s intercontinental missiles.2 Park Chan-kyong, “N. Korea Leader Says ‘All of US within Range after Missile Test,” AFP News, July 29, 2017, https://sg.news.yahoo.com/n-korea-launches-another-ballistic-missile-us-160151580.html. The DPRK’s nuclear weapons development has advanced even further. Substantial progress has been made in the production of weapons-grade plutonium and enriched uranium as well as the test of nuclear fission warheads and thermonuclear fusion warheads.The US Defense Intelligence Agency believes that after a series of nuclear tests conducted since 2006, the DPRK has been able to miniaturize a nuclear warhead to carry it on its long-range ballistic missiles.3 Joby Warrick, Ellen Nakashima and Anna Fifield, “DPRK Now Making Missile-Ready Nuclear Weapons, US Analysts Say,” The Washington Post, August 8, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/north-korea-now-making-missile-ready-nuclear-weapons-us-analysts-say/2017/08/08/e14b882a-7b6b-11e7-9d08-b79f191668ed_story.html. It is conservatively estimated that the DPRK has between 13 to 30 nuclear warheads.4 David Albright, “DPRK’s Nuclear Capabilities: A Fresh Look,” Institute for Science and International Security report, April 26, 2017, http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/north-koreas-nuclear-capabilities-afresh-look/10. The various tests already conducted by the DPRK showcase the country’s commitment to becoming a world-class nuclear player with various land and sea-based mobile launchers and the capability to strike anywhere in the United States.

From a geostrategic point of view, the rise of the newborn nuclear power means that the small peninsula will give birth to a nuclear state guided by the principle of preemptive strike, which in turn will accelerate the structural shift from the “peace with terror” based on inter-Korean mutual deterrence toward the mutual assurance of nuclear destruction between the DPRK and the US.

Although the DPRK will never develop the same size of nuclear arsenal as that of the US, the strategic location of the peninsular country between China and the ROK has created a de facto asymmetrical balance of nuclear terror. The only nuclear test site of the DPRK is located in Punggye-ri, less than 80 kilometers away from Changbai county in China’s Jilin Province. If the US plans to conduct a nuclear strike against the state with an area slightly exceeding 120,000 square kilometers, it will doubtlessly be opposed by both the ROK and China. This is a concern the US must consider before deciding a nuclear attack. Unlike the US, should the DPRK desire to use hydrogen bombs to preemptively strike the vastly populated United States, it need not consider any third-party factor. It may not even have to consider the so-called “precision bombing.” This is the basic geopolitical condition for the DPRK to achieve “nuclear deterrence balance” with the US. The status quo could be understood as a geopolitical lever that will not only escalate the mutual deterrence between the DPRK and the ROK to the dangerous mutual assurance of destruction by weapons of mass destruction, but will also make the US accelerate the deployment of its missile defense and offence forces on the Korean Peninsula and even in the broader Northeast Asia. Such a situation will likely result in greater strategic investment from the US to the Peninsula.

Second, the US-ROK military alliance has been continuing its strategic transformation with the goal of destroying the DPRK regime.With the deteriorating situation on the Korean Peninsula, the scope of cooperation and operational coordination by the US-ROK military alliance has been constantly adjusted in depth. Hence, the goal of the alliance has changed from a defensive posture focused on defeating a DPRK invasion to preemptive destruction of the DPRK regime. The nature of the US-ROK alliance has shifted from defensive to offensive. This transformation has been highlighted by the continuous renewal and adjustment of the US-ROK alliance’s combat plans against the DPRK.

The Operations Plan 5027 (OPLAN 5027) is the most important plan of the United States and the ROK targeting the DPRK. During the Cold War, this US-dominated plan was changed from a model of “retreatdefense-counterattack” to a model of “forward deployment-defensecounterattack.” With the end of the Cold War and the escalation of the DPRK nuclear crisis, the OPLAN 5027 has been increasingly focused on completely destroying the DPRK regime in a total war. Following the outbreak of the first DPRK nuclear crisis in 1994, the United States made drastic adjustments to its combat scenarios and demanded the use of the US military bases in Japan to provide logistical support to the Korean Peninsula should a war break out. After the Bush administration proposed the strategy of preemptive strike against the DPRK in 2002, the US military immediately amended the plan accordingly and proposed the US military to attack the DPRK alone if necessary, even without consulting the ROK. With the continuous progress of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program, the United States has continuously revised and updated the OPLAN 5027 and successively formulated the OPLANs 5027-04 and 5027-06, which witnessed major structural adjustments to the US-ROK allied forces, making a massive reduction in the number of artillery and ground troops and replacing them with naval and air force units and precision-guided missiles as the main force and means of fighting against the DPRK. In order to accelerate the abovementioned transformation of operational modes of the US-ROK allied forces, the United States and the ROK rolled out the OPLAN 5027-08 and established an integrated plan for the formation and coordinated actions of the allied force units in the coming period.

With the acceleration of the DPRK’s nuclear missile development and testing in recent years, the United States and ROK have especially formulated the OPLAN 5015 for “the 21st-century approach of precision strike and limited war” and expanded the scale of joint military exercises since 2015. The subjects of military exercises include 4D (detect, disrupt,destroy and defend) operations, special force operations, decapitation strike,targeted bombing of deep tunnels, beach landing and seizure of key points,among others, with an aim to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of a preemptive strike against the DPRK.5 Michael Peck, “OPLAN 5015: The Secret Plan for Destroying DPRK (and Start World War III?),” The National Interest, March 11, 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/oplan-5015-the-secret-plandestroying-north-korea-start-19747.

The above adjustment process has gradually transformed the US-ROK military alliance into an offensive alliance able to eliminate the DPRK regime. This increasingly clear strategic and tactical readjustment against the DPRK regime and its supreme leader has prompted the DPRK to further enhance its nuclear deterrence and thus escalated the tensions on the Peninsula, resulting in both sides being dragged deeper and deeper into the security dilemma.

在利用式(5)描述的离散测速方程估计目标转速时，为了避免电角度数据累加溢出，依据eNk或eSk的周期性，将Θk的值域限定在一个周期内，即在算法运行过程中，当Θk从零递增至2πp时就将它清零，使得0≤Θk≤2πp。

取能见度为1 km，平流雾和辐射雾的谱分布如图1所示.由图1可知，当能见度为1 km时，随着粒子半径的增加，两种雾的谱分布曲线均先增加后减小，且两种雾的浓度在半径较小一侧迅速增大，在半径大的一侧则缓慢减小.其中平流雾的雾滴粒子半径较集中在2～5 μm，辐射雾的雾滴粒子半径较集中在0.1～2 μm，且辐射雾粒子浓度约大于平流雾粒子浓度两个数量级.

Conflicting security interests of opposing blocs

At the regional level, the post-war security order in Northeast Asia,which was based on the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation but was then seriously distorted by the Treaty of San Francisco, is facing increasingly acute challenges in its stability, adaptability and sustainability.However, a new security order is far from taking shape. In this transitional period, whether a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula can be achieved directly concerns the security of the Korean Peninsula and the kind of security order that would replace the old one based on the temporary armistice agreement of 1953. A security order based on mutual assurance of destruction will inevitably push both the DPRK and the ROK into the dangerous abyss of security dilemma. Establishing a permanent peace mechanism based on a denuclearized Korean Peninsula will not only ensure that both the DPRK and the ROK enjoy common security and long-term stability, but is also an essential prerequisite for peaceful unification of the Peninsula.

THAAD is one of the missile defense systems with the highest success rate in tests. The maximum interception range is 200 kilometers and the vertical range is as high as 150 kilometers. Although THAAD is a tactical anti-missile weapon, the X-band radar equipped to the system has a maximum surveillance range of 1,500-2,000 kilometers. This can monitor not only the military targets in a large area of eastern China, but also the whole process of China’s intercontinental ballistic missiles, if the X-band radar approaching China is networked with the S-band radar in Alaska.Theodore Postol, professor of science, technology, and security policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and former US Chief of Naval Operations science and policy advisor, has indicated that deploying THAAD in the ROK threatens China’s strategic deterrence capability.6 “US THAAD System in ROK Would Threaten China’s Deterrent,” Sputnik International, April 3, 2016,https://sputniknews.com/world/201603041035754227-us-thaad-system-would-threaten-chinas-deterrent. Similarly, the deployment poses threat to Russia’s strategic deterrence in its far eastern region, and therefore has been strongly opposed by both China and Russia. As pointed out in a joint statement by the two countries, the crux of anti-missile systems such as THAAD is that they break the global and regional strategic balance and undermine strategic stability. “China and Russia oppose the strengthening of military presence by external forces in Northeast Asia, and oppose building a new anti-missile outpost in the region as part of the US missile defense network in the Pacific under the pretext of the DPRK nuclear and missile threats.”7 “China-Russia Joint Statement Criticizes US Destabilizing Global Strategic Balance,” People.com.cn,June 27, 2016, http://sc.people.com.cn/n2/2016/0627/c345527-28569003.html. Although the ROK has,through a series of dialogues with China on the THAAD issue, formally promised not to target third parties or undermine China’s strategic and security interests, there remain uncertainties regarding the implementation of such commitment.

Nuclear Issue: Key Variable in Peninsula’s Security Dilemma

Among the various complex contradictions in the Korean Peninsula security dilemma, the major one is the wrestling over the nuclear issue by the DPRK and the United States. This is not only causing turmoil in the security situation around the Korean Peninsula, but also profoundly affecting the security order on the Peninsula. The DPRK nuclear issue continues to deteriorate due to two abnormalities on the Peninsula. First, the Korean Peninsula remains in a state of war de jure. Although the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement resulted in an effective ceasefire, formal negotiations have not been held and a peace agreement to ensure the Korean Peninsula’s lasting peace and security has yet to be signed. Second, the Korean Peninsula is still in a cold war status. Although the Cold War has long ended, the relations between the DPRK, on one side, and the United States and the ROK, on the other, are far from normal. In fact, relations have continued to deteriorate, which has prompted both sides to strive to develop the strategic strike capability to destroy the other.

在注重质量管理的同时，也要提高对安全管理的重视程度，确保PPP投资型项目安全管理效果。制定完善的安全管理制度，严格落实安全管理责任制，明确每个施工班组和施工人员的安全管理职责[4]，让他们认真遵守施工安全管理制度，提升安全管理水平，避免发生安全事故，让PPP投资型项目建设取得更好效果。

This is the geo-political environment on the Korean Peninsula in which the state of war and the status of cold war are superimposed on each other.Since the early 1990s, the DPRK nuclear issue has been a determining factor for the ups and downs between the DPRK and the United States. It also leads the direction of the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

测试护理人员的护理能力，及时查找护理工作期间会产生的各项失误，制定良好的解决方案，防止因为失误引发的不良后果，提高护理管理的记录水平，保证清楚的书写各项护理记录，便于在出现护理管理失误期间及时找出失误原因，同时制定处理措施，下降伤害到最低。

Urgency to develop sustainable security in the region

For the DPRK, who faces huge external military threats as well as isolation and blockade, the power of nuclear weapons and the capability to deliver ballistic missiles are both a strategic means necessary to safeguard its national security and regime survival, and a critical leverage to facilitate the improvement of US-DPRK relations. It is precisely because the possession of nuclear weapons can bring tremendous security and strategic interests that the DPRK, under heavy pressure from the international community, wants to become a nuclear power and rely on its nuclear weapons to establish“equilibrium” of military force with the US.11 “North Korea Will Reach Its Nuclear Force Goal - Kim Jong-un,” BBC, September 16, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41289532. However, for the United States, the DPRK’s nuclear weapons are not only related to the survival of global nuclear non-proliferation system, but are also directly related to the US homeland security and its “strategic credibility” as the provider of nuclear umbrella for allies. Therefore, the United States has continuously strengthened the deployment of its armed forces capable of destroying the DPRK regime, and persuaded the ROK to deploy THAAD, looking to topple the DPRK regime that rejects denuclearization.

The diametrically opposed strategic resolves and interests between the DPRK and the United States have made the nuclear issue an encased knot for the security plight of the Korean Peninsula. The more the DPRK speeds up the pace of developing its nuclear weapons and missiles, the more the US-ROK alliance accelerates its preparation for a military strike against the DPRK, putting the latter under greater threats, which, in turn, further encourages its development of nuclear arms. Kim Jong-un has publicly announced that the DPRK’s goal of establishing a balance of power with the United States has come to the final stage,12 “Kim Jung-un: DPRK Nuclear Development Nears Ultimate Goal of Balance with US,” Lianhe Zaobao, September 16, 2017, http://www.zaobao.com/realtime/world/story20170916-795789. which means that the DPRK now poses an unprecedented threat not only to the ROK, but also to the US homeland. In response, the US President Donald Trump has repeatedly stated that the “strategic patience” of the US government is over, and that all options for resolving the nuclear issue are on the table.13 Peter Jacobs and David Choi, “Trump Warns DPRK after Missile Passes over Japan: ‘All options Are on the Table’,” Business Insider, August 29, 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-north-korea-alloptions-are-on-the-table-2017-8. The sharply opposed stances of the DPRK and the US show that the nuclear issue, evolving since the end of the Cold War, is now at a historic crossroads. By deterring each other with nuclear weapons, the security situation on the Korean Peninsula has reached the edge of war. Either the two sides jointly walk out of the security dilemma or continue to be trapped in the status that is more likely to run out of control, this “balance of terror” cannot sustain. The answer depends on the ability of parties concerned to terminate the mutual threat and open up a path of common security on the Peninsula.

Way Out: Common Security Based on Denuclearization

In more than two decades since the first nuclear crisis broke out in the 1990s, the DPRK’s nuclear deterrence has grown from scratch and developed from weak to strong, but the external environment facing the country has become even more unsafe. The ROK and the United States have continuously strengthened their military alliance during the same period,and the US has deployed strategic weapons of unprecedented density in and around the Korean Peninsula. However, the ROK and even the US have similarly become more insecure. This profoundly shows that there is no way out by relying on deterrence to safeguard one’s own security.

Third, the introduction of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense(THAAD) system in the ROK has further complicated the situation and might lock the security of the Korean Peninsula into major-power strategic competition. While the ROK has vigorously developed its ability to attack the DPRK, it has completed the deployment of the THAAD missile defense system. On the surface, the move is a response to the DPRK’s ballistic missile threats. In fact, what is at stake is the US global deployment of its missile defense network.

The situation of the Korean Peninsula stabilizes whenever the DPRK and the United States reach compromise and fulfill agreement on the nuclear issue. The DPRK’s plan to secretly develop nuclear weapons started in the 1950s, but only after the Cold War did its nuclear capabilities start to become a real concern. From 1993 to 1994, the DPRK and the United States became sharply antagonistic to each other over the inspection of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, triggering the US to prepare for a “surgical”military attack. Later on, however, the two countries signed a framework agreement after tense negotiations, which not only defused the immediate crisis of war, but also opened the door to bilateral relations. Based on the framework agreement, the two sides went through intensive negotiations,focusing on 21 issues including denuclearization, the DPRK’s ballistic missile development, terrorism, economic and trade relations, establishment of liaison offices and energy development projects on the Korean Peninsula,among others. Bilateral agreements on 18 issues were signed.8 Robert Carlin and John W. Lewis, Negotiations with DPRK: 1992-2007, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, January 2008, http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/publications/negotiating_with_north_korea_19922007. During this period, the security relations between the US and the DPRK apparently stabilized, and the US, by means of the United Nations, started to provide the DPRK with sizable grants. In particular, in response to the food shortage in the DPRK, the US government provided about 1.09 million tons of free food aid during the fiscal years of 1995-2000.9 “US Assistance to DPRK,” CRS Report, RS21834, updated July 31, 2008, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21834.pdf. A joint communiqué was issued by the two countries in 2000, proclaiming that they would work together to “build a new relationship free from past enmity.”10 “US-DPRK Joint Communique,” October 12, 2000, https://1997-2001.state.gov/www/regions/eap/001012_usdprk_jointcom.html. Negotiation and cooperation between the DPRK and the US on the critical and sensitive nuclear issue not only made a significant breakthrough and improvement in the bilateral relations, but also led the tensions on the Korean Peninsula to ease and created the necessary political climate for the first inter-Korean summit in 2002. During this period, the mutual hostility between the DPRK and the US-ROK alliance was at a relatively low level.

Looking at the long-term and sharp confrontation between the ROK and the DPRK since the armistice of the Korean War, it can be seen that the state of war and the status of cold war on the Korean Peninsula has divided the security interests between the two sides. This is the root cause of the security dilemma on the Peninsula. The geopolitical background of such relations is that the US-led alliance system in Northeast Asia is opposed to countries outside the bloc in terms of security interests.

当然，通过例1的学习，学生只是掌握了处理“求线段长”问题思考方向与思维调控技巧，要想追求“以题会类”的习题教学最高境界，还需通过下列中考题分类剖析，以进一步丰富学生处理“求线段长”类问题的转化策略，提高处理同类问题的“类化”能力．

From the partial logic of the US-ROK alliance, the more military cooperation between the two sides and between the three sides of the US,Japan and the ROK, the more guaranteed is their “collective security.”However, the reality is that peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia is not only the fundamental interest of the three “collective security” members of the US, the ROK and Japan, but also the fundamental interest of the DPRK, China, Russia and other countries. In the small area of the Korean Peninsula, dividing the DPRK and the ROK into the target of attack and the protected object, under the Cold War mentality of bloc politics, will inevitably lead to a security dilemma for both sides. In Northeast Asia, where security interests are intertwined, separating relevant countries in and out of the region into “collective security” members and non-“collective security” members fundamentally puts the countries in these two groups into a zero-sum game. When the former group strive to enhance their own security by strengthening military cooperation and building armaments, the latter bloc would immediately feel the increase in security threats and thus inevitably respond by cementing their own security. This, in turn, adds to the sense of insecurity among the members of the former group. The gradual escalation of such negative security interactions will necessarily lead to the situation where the security gains of one group is always at the expense of the other’s compromised security. One party’s pursuit of its own security has become the root cause of the other’s insecurity.14 John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patria Owens, The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 95.

取出铣刀，合拢两对接管口，检查管口对齐情况。其错位量控制应不超过管壁厚度的10%或1mm，通过调整管材直线度和松紧卡瓦可在一定程度上改善管口的对位偏差；管口合拢后其接触面间应无明显缝隙，缝隙宽度 不 能 超 过 ：0.3 mm（D≤225）、0.5 mm（225 mm＜D≤400 mm）或 1.0 mm（D＞400mm）。如不满足上述要求应重新铣削，直到满足要求为止。

The situation on the Korean Peninsula deteriorates and runs the risk of war when the DPRK-US antagonism over the nuclear issue escalates. When the United States discovered the DPRK’s secret development of enriched uranium, which is in violation of the Framework Agreement,in 2002, it immediately rescinded the agreement, prompting the DPRK to publicly accelerate its pace of nuclear weapons development. The security landscape on the Korean Peninsula and the relatively stable US-DPRK and inter-Korean relations were thus completely broken, and the tense confrontation focusing on the DPRK nuclear issue entered a period of escalating turmoil and deterioration. From the first nuclear test in September 2006, which signified the DPRK crossing the nuclear threshold, to the sixth test in September 2017 and the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile test in November the same year, the DPRK has obtained the strategic deterrence capability to destroy the ROK and strike the US homeland. In response, the US-ROK alliance has continuously strengthened its ability to deter the DPRK. The United States has established and deployed on the Peninsula the capacity to destroy the DPRK with extended nuclear deterrence.In this stage of the security dilemma, in which both sides compete to strengthen their respective deterrence, the nuclear weapons available for the DPRK became the core issue of the US-DPRK strategic competition.

The deteriorating security predicament on the Korean Peninsula is mainly due to the unsustainability of regional security order, which is based on the antagonism of security interests. In recent years, the frequent crisis basically reflects the fact that the security order on the Peninsula and even in Northeast Asia is becoming increasingly unsustainable and is entering a period of profound readjustment and transformation.

孟宝民表示，旅游是不断满足人们美好生活需求的幸福产业，是全面建成小康社会的应有之义。2019年，全省文化和旅游系统将按照文化和旅游部安排部署，认真落实省委、省政府的决策要求，紧盯国际一流文化旅游中心建设目标，持续抓好全域旅游示范省创建工作，不断推动全省旅游高质量发展，为落实“五新”战略任务，推动“三个经济”发展助力添彩！

Using the DPRK missile threat as an excuse to introduce THAAD into the ROK followed a similar pattern as introducing missile defense systems into Europe under the pretext of the Iranian missile threat. It is in fact a strategic move of the United States aimed at building a global missile defense network. The expansion of THAAD into the ROK lays a solid foundation for the US to gradually establish a missile defense network in East Asia similar to the one it has in Europe.

The concept of common security, as proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the 2014 Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), pointed out the direction for transcending the security dilemma on the Korean Peninsula. “We cannot just have the security of one or some countries while leaving the rest insecure, still less should one seek the so-called absolute security of itself at the expense of the security of others.”15 “New Asian Security Concept For New Progress in Security Cooperation: Remarks at the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia,” May 21, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1159951.shtml. This universal, equal and inclusive common security is the way out of security dilemma, and is highly applicable to the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, which is deeply trapped in the dilemma. In the long-term standoff between the DPRK and the ROK, if one wants to ensure its own security, it must also take into account the security of the other. In Northeast Asia, where security relations between the countries are complicated,historical issues and current disputes are entangled, and forces in and outside the region are intertwined, the expansion of the so-called “right of collective self-defense” and the enhancement of the “collective security”system will inevitably push other countries to step up their corresponding security measures. One country seeking to strengthen its own security will always cause other countries to take countermeasures, which will only lead to a deeper security dilemma for the country concerned. The DPRK, the ROK and the United States cannot break out of their security plights by continuing to increase “nuclear deterrence” or “extended nuclear deterrence.”Only by reducing the threats to each other and establishing a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula can the security dilemma that has ensnared all parties be broken and peace, stability and prosperity be realized.

“Double Suspension” toward “Dual-Track Negotiation”

There are many different proposals on how to break the security plight caused by the “mutual deterrence” and realize denuclearization and permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. China’s proposal is to move from“double suspension” to “dual-track negotiation,”16 “Chinese FM Calls for Non-Proliferation Efforts, Peace Talks on Korean Peninsula,” Xinhua, April 29,2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-04/29/c_136244611.htm. achieving denuclearization and long-lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula through dialogue, negotiation and cooperation. First of all, based on the principle of “commitment for commitment, action for action” established by the September 19 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, it calls for the DPRK

to suspend its nuclear and missile development activities while the US and ROK suspend their large-scale military exercises, so as to ease tensions on the Peninsula and identify a place of breakthrough to resume the peace talks. Second, based on the stability of situation on the Peninsula, parallel progress would be made on two tracks: one is resuming the Six-Party Talks,and, according to the objectives established by the parties of the September 19 Joint Statement, achieving “two completely,” that is, the DPRK completely abandons its nuclear weapons and related missile programs while its reasonable concerns, such as those concerning its sovereignty, territorial security and international status, are completely addressed. The other track is to initiate negotiations on the establishment of a peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula. in accordance with the recommendations and consensus of the September 19 Joint Statement. All parties, including the DPRK and the ROK, the two countries triggering the Korean War and the direct stakeholders of the current situation, as well as China and the United States, the two most prominent antagonists in the war and the most important external forces today, would jointly negotiate the establishment of a permanent peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula to replace the provisional Korean Armistice Agreement and thus bring about lasting peace to the Peninsula.

South Korean National Security Adviser Chung Eui-yong (center) briefs reporters outside the West Wing of the White House on March 8, 2018, in Washington, D.C.,announcing US President Donald Trump has agreed to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un by May.

The denuclearization and permanent peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula that the dual-track negotiation aims to realize are in essence a legal and order arrangement, which should and must address four basic issues: First, common security should be guaranteed by international treaties, especially the sovereignty and territorial integrity, dignity and international status of the DPRK and the ROK. This requires legally ending the state of war that still exists between the DPRK on one side and the ROK and the US on the other, terminating the United States’ hostile policy against the DPRK and the antagonism between the two countries,ensuring the normalization of relations and peaceful coexistence among the DPRK, the ROK and other countries. Second, comprehensive security on the Korean Peninsula, involving both traditional and non-traditional security, should be addressed in a coordinated way. In particular, the security interests of both the DPRK and ROK in terms of military, environment and economy should be carefully managed. Third, cooperative security involving equal participation by all parties under a stable multilateral framework should be established, making dialogue and cooperation via multiple channels the basis for common security of all parties. Fourth, the rights of peaceful development of both sides of the Peninsula should be respected, so as to realize and maintain the sustainable security of the Korean Peninsula.This requires integrating all the positive achievements of inter-Korean dialogues since the signing of the 1991 Basic Agreement, especially the outcomes of joint declarations of the two inter-Korean summits, so that a legal framework for peace, reconciliation and cooperation can be established and the process of peaceful unification can restart. In addition, as the two external forces most influential on the situation of the Korean Peninsula,China and the United States have the obligation to establish and abide by the basic principle of actively engaging in the economic development and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula.

在互联网资源较匮乏的年代，教师创设教学情境的途径较单一，其往往依靠口头表达、板书设计、教材阅读等方式激发学生的情境想象力，从而督促他们完成知识的迁移，但教学成果并不明显，这样只会让学生陷入机械化的学习状态中，既不能帮助学生形象化感知抽象的理论知识，同时又会打击学生学习的自信心。大数据时代已经悄然到来，其诞生了丰富多彩的教育文本，比如：视频、影视剧、图片、声音等，这就为教师创设多元化的教学情境提供了便利条件。

Since the DPRK and the US-ROK alliance have been trapped in the security dilemma for decades, it is no easy task to achieve common,comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security on the Korean Peninsula on a nuclear-free basis. As the nuclear issue is at stake to all parties, it seems that it is difficult for any one of them to compromise. However, peacefully resolving the nuclear issue is in the interest of all parties, including the DPRK and the United States. This determines the feasibility of resolving the nuclear issue through negotiation. On the surface, the DPRK-US contradiction on the issue has become increasingly irreconcilable and may even lead to the outbreak of war. However, it is precisely because peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue is mutually beneficial that the DPRK and the US have released positive signals for resolution of the nuclear issue through negotiation at the same time they have maintained tough and confrontational stands. Shortly after the Independence Day of the United States in 2016, the DPRK reiterated its position of realizing a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and listed five preconditions for a denuclearization.17 “DPRK Government Denounces U.S., S. Korea’s Sophism about ‘Denuclearization of North’,” KCNA,July 6, 2016, http://www.kcna.kp/kcna.user.article.retrieveNewsViewInfoList.kcmsf#this. In 2017, the US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson repeatedly stated his “Four Nos” policy which includes “not seeking regime change.”18 “China Supports US Dialogue with North Korea at Some Point,” The Hill, August 3, 2017, http://thehill.com/policy/international/345109-china-supports-us-dialogue-with-north-korea-at-some-point. Although there is still a large gap between their positions, they have displayed some common ground and similarities. These commonalities and similarities not only constitute the political basis for negotiation and dialogue to resolve the nuclear issue, but also provide important positive factors for all parties concerned to build their common security and get out of the security dilemma. The “dual-track negotiation” China calls for and emphasizes is a pragmatic and feasible solution, making full use of the common interests and common needs of all parties involved in the peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue, to realize a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula through the Six-Party Talks and purse common security through negotiation on a permanent peace mechanism on the Peninsula.

To achieve common security on the Korean Peninsula, which involves multiple parties and long-term antagonism, not only requires dialogue and negotiation, but also needs to establish an appropriate multilateral cooperation framework. In view of the particularity of the Korean Peninsula, there is no ready-made experience and mode of reference.However, through the Six-Party Talks, the countries concerned have not only explored the possibility of denuclearization and peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, but also made a helpful attempt on common security cooperation based on peaceful coexistence of the six countries in Northeast Asia. This is highlighted in the September 19 Joint Statement. After arduous negotiations and bargaining by the parties, the document established the common goal of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and the path of“commitment for commitment, action for action,” and pledged to “negotiate the permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.” An objective of the six countries establishing a Northeast Asian security cooperation mechanism based on sovereign equality and peaceful co-existence was also set in the Joint Statement.19 “Full Text of 6-Party Talks Joint Statement,” China Daily, September 19, 2005, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-09/19/content_479150.htm. If the Six-Party Talks can successfully resolve the complicated nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, this dialogue mechanism can naturally evolve into a mature security cooperation mechanism in Northeast Asia and become a guide for all countries concerned to get out of the security dilemma and realize longterm peace and stability. Therefore, the practice of the Six-Party Talks and its consensus concepts are valuable assets and a realistic basis for building common security in Northeast Asia.

如今，我国农业及农村地区的经济发展已迈入新的历史阶段，需要借助科技力量来实现创新发展及内生增长。合理调整农业科技的创新发展方向，积极调整并优化，适时改革，以此来创新现有的发展模式，打造特色农业。紧扣生态与现代农业的创新要素，实现农业发展的多方面进步，比如品种、生产工艺、流程及组织等多方面，从而构建出更全面的农业科技创新模式，形成长期有效的创新产业机制，保持农业的特色发展动力与活力，从根本上保证旅游观光业的积极发展[5]。

Although the Six-Party Talks have stalled for many years and suffered serious setbacks, the deteriorating crisis on the Korean Peninsula and the increasingly worsening security dilemma after the suspension of the Talks have exactly revealed the value of common interests enshrined in the mechanism. Objectively speaking, regarding the nuclear issue or even the Korean Peninsula’s peace and security, no country will be able to seize all benefits and become the sole winner. Restarting the Six-Party Talks to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully and negotiate a permanent peace mechanism for the Korean Peninsula is a win-win choice. In an era of increasing interdependence, it is an inevitable historical trend to establish a mechanism for common security on the Korean Peninsula and even in Northeast Asia that transcends social systems and ideological differences.Relevant countries in the region should follow the trend of the times and actively explore the possibility of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security that benefits all parties through wide consultation and joint contribution.

Conclusion

The security interests of the DPRK and the ROK are closely intertwined and interact with each other. Any unilateral efforts made by one side to reinforce its own security will inevitably lead to reaction by the other side.Therefore, the competition between the DPRK and the US-ROK alliance to guarantee their respective security at the expense of the other only leads to deepening security dilemma. To ensure its own security, each side must take into account the security of other relevant parties. Deterring others with nuclear weapons would be counterproductive. This is an objective law independent of the will of any country. All parties in Northeast Asia must work together to surpass all the disputes brought about by the “collective security” distorted by the Cold War and seek for a feasible path of common security.