The Indian Ocean Policy of the Modi Government

Since coming to power in May 2014, the Narendra Modi government of India has endeavored to adjust the country’s foreign policy, with the most drastic changes taking place in its Indian Ocean policy. Modi’s strong personality, together with his Bharatiya Janata Party’s majority status in Lok Sabha, the lower house of India’s bicameral parliament, helped lay a solid foundation for his brand of Indian Ocean policy. This will not only have implications for the development of India’s maritime strategy, but will also influence India’s interactions with other countries in this region, leading to an inevitable transformation of the Indian Ocean’s geopolitical landscape. Therefore, an in-depth analysis of this topic is of great significance.

Visions of Modi’s Indian Ocean Policy

Since winning independence from Britain in 1947, India’s policy on the Indian Ocean has been in a state of constant evolution, reflecting both regional and global power struggles. At the beginning of India’s independence when the Indian Ocean was still dominated by the British,India mainly relied upon Britain for protection of its Indian Ocean interests. Only towards the end of 1960s, when Britain withdrew its troops from the east of the Suez Canal, did India begin to pay serious attention to the formation of its Indian Ocean policy. In the wake of the British withdrawal, India, with an aim to fill the power vacuum left by the British, began to actively develop its naval power, supported the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace proposal, and tried to prevent the Indian Ocean from descending into a rivalry arena for the US and the Soviet Union, the two superpowers at that time. Since the end of the Cold War, a prevailing objective for Indian policy strategists has been to restore India’s historical influence in the Indian Ocean region.1 C Raja Mohan, “Modi and the Indian Ocean: Restoring India’s Sphere of Influence,” Insights of Institute of South Asian Studies of National University of Singapore, No.277, March 20, 2015, p.3. Notwithstanding, this goal never cohered into a vibrant national strategy, as few Indian leaders managed to systematically elaborate on, let alone implement, their Indian Ocean policies.2 Ibid. However, since the election of Modi as Prime Minister of India, this trend has been reversed. Besides sharing the common goal of shaping India into the dominant power in the Indian Ocean, the Modi government has demonstrated its own characteristic in its visions and measures regarding the future of the Indian Ocean. The Modi government is currently endeavoring to create a favorable maritime environment for the rise of India, shape a benign yet strong image of India to its neighbors,expand India’s influence, and maximize its interests in the region. Towards this end, the Modi government has proposed the following visions for its Indian Ocean policy.

水下分流河道：扇三角洲前缘亚相的沉积主体，岩石类型为(砂)砾岩、中细砂岩并夹薄层泥岩，中等分选，但明显好于平原亚相，岩石组合呈现多层楼式的正韵律，亦可见复合韵律；测井曲线表现为自然伽马、电阻率曲线上幅度相对较高，SP曲线呈较平滑的箱型和钟形。

Indian Ocean as an important region for India’s diplomacy

Owing to its geographic location, previous Indian governments had prioritized South Asia diplomacy, but lacked a clear position on the Indian Ocean. The Modi government is different in that it regards the Indian Ocean as an immediate and extended neighborhood, as well as an important region for India’s diplomacy.3 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (UK), “India’s New Maritime Strategies,” Strategic Comments, Vol.21, No.37, December 2015, p.9. Modi’s invitation of the President of Mauritius, an island country in the Indian Ocean, to his inauguration ceremony as the only head of state ouside South Asia signaled a change in India’s Indian Ocean policy.4 Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy, “The Indian Ocean Policy of the Modi Government,” in Sinderpal Singh,Modi and the World: (Re)Constructing Indian Foreign Policy, Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Company, 2017, p.171. The Modi government also announced its decision to set up the National Maritime Authority to strengthen the country’s management of Indian Ocean affairs. In addition, Modi’s first trip upon taking office was a visit to Goa to attend the commissioning ceremony of India’s biggest aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, and Mauritius and the Seychelles were designated as India’s neighboring countries by the new Indian Ocean Region Division, which was established under the Ministry of External Affairs in January 2016 with the specific responsibility of dealing with Indian Ocean affairs.5 Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report 2015-16, p.18. Each of the above actions reflects the greater importance attached to this region by Modi than his predecessor Manmohan Singh, and illustrates that the Indian Ocean region is now regarded with greater strategic importance within India’s foreign policy.6 Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy, “The Indian Ocean Policy of the Modi Government,” p. 172. Modi’s actions also sent a signal to other Indian Ocean countries that engagement with states in the Indian Ocean would be an important direction for India’s foreign policy in the foreseeable future.7 C Raja Mohan, “Modi and the Indian Ocean: Restoring India’s Sphere of Influence,” p.3.

This policy stance is closely related to India’s heavy reliance on the Indian Ocean where most of its maritime interests converge. India boasts a coast line of 7,517 kilometers, with 193,800 square kilometers of territorial waters that contain 1,200 islands, and an exclusive economic zone of 2.02 million square kilometers. 90% of India’s foreign trade by volume and 70%by value are transported via the Indian Ocean, accounting for more than a third of India’s GDP.8 Gopal Suri, “India’s Maritime Security Concerns and the Indian Ocean Region,” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, Vol.11, No.3, July-September 2016, p.247. Aside from economic reliance, India is also concerned about unconventional maritime security threats, especially terrorism, in the Indian Ocean. In the white paper released by the Ministry of Defence in October 2015, titled Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy,the Modi government defined India’s maritime core interests as follows:“Protect India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity against threats in the maritime environment”; “promote safety and security of Indian citizens,shipping, fishing, trade, energy supply, assets and resources in the maritime domain”; “pursue peace, stability and security in India’s maritime zones,maritime neighborhood and other areas of maritime interest”; and “preserve and protect other national interests in the maritime dimension.”9 Indian Navy, Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy, Naval Strategic Publication,October 2015, p.9, https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf. This document summarized three reasons for the importance of the Indian Ocean affairs: first, “the sweeping change that the global and regional geo-strategic environment has seen during the period. The shift in worldview from a Euro-Atlantic to an Indo-Pacific focus and the repositioning of global economic and military power towards Asia has resulted in significant political,economic and social changes in the Indian Ocean region and impacted India’s maritime environment in tangible ways”; second, “a considerable change that India’s security-cum-threat calculus has seen during the period.In addition to persisting threats and challenges of the ‘traditional’ nature,India’s maritime security environment has become even more complex and unpredictable today with the expansion in scale and presence of a variety of‘non-traditional’ threats,” which demanded “a re-evaluation of our maritime security ... including coastal and offshore security”; third, “a national outlook towards the seas and the maritime domain, and a clearer recognition of maritime security being a vital element of national progress and international engagement,” thus India needs to employ “maritime security engagement as a cornerstone for her regional foreign policy initiatives.”10 Ibid., p.ii.

Corresponding to these changes, this document also expanded India’s scope of maritime interests, which is the most radical departure from the last maritime strategy in 2007. A comparison of the two maritime strategies illustrates several differences. First, the new maritime strategy expanded India’s scope of interests in Southeast and West Indian Ocean. India’s sea routes to the Pacific, the East China Sea, the Mediterranean Sea and the west coast of Africa were listed as “secondary areas of interest” in the 2015 maritime strategy, while the 2007 strategy listed only littoral regions of Australia and the east coast of Africa under this category. Second, the new maritime strategy elevated the status of some “secondary areas of interest” to “primary areas of interest,”including Southwestern Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. In addition,the new strategy highlighted the status of the Six-Degree Channel and Eight/Nine-Degree Channel in the Indian Ocean, and included the Mandeb Strait and the Mozambique Channel as “choke points.”11 Gurpreet S Khurana, “Indian Navy Updates Indian Maritime Doctrine 2009,” in Vijay Sakhuja and Gurpreet S Khurana, Maritime Perspectives 2016, New Delhi: National Maritime Foundation, 2017, pp.33-34. The strategy also placed special emphasis on the severity of non-traditional security threats and the necessity of unimpeded utilization of the sea. To summarize, this new strategy reflects the maritime ambition of the Modi government, and serves as a guide for future management of maritime affairs and development of naval forces.

漂流木在开阔的海上漂浮，开始了它们漫长的旅程，时间长短取决于不同的树种，最长可历时17个月。在这段漂泊海上的时间里，这些无根的死木变成了漂浮的珊瑚礁，为多种多样的海洋生物提供了漂浮水面上的栖息地，其中包括将它们的卵产在浮木上的无翅水黾，水黾是唯一一种生活在开阔海域里的昆虫。

Responsibility to advance SAGAR in the Indian Ocean

人口数量和结构的变化直接影响到资源的利用和生态环境的保护。随着人口的增加，河北省承德市人均水资源量不断减少，20世纪50年代，人均水资源量2 150 m3，进入21世纪以来，人均水资源量为933 m3（见表1）。人均水资源量的减少，使得水资源供需矛盾日趋尖锐。

第一，要树立绿色生态文明城市观念，让每一位公民自觉投入到生态文明建设中。绿色生态城市文明观念在公民心中一直是一个很模糊的概念，在城市文明建设的过程中，要多组织一些有关城市生态文明、城市森林文化工程、城市生态文化工程建设等活动，让广大居民能够从城市林业建设中，体会到人与自然和谐相处的意义，树立居民的生态文明观、道德观，发展绿色文化，让大家养成尊重自然，爱护环境的好习惯，在提高自身参与度的同时，增强责任感[3]。

As to the SAGAR initiative, Modi once said that, “The Indian Ocean is critical to the future of the world … we will all prosper when the seas are safe, secure and free for all.”15 Ibid., p.167. This statement demonstrates that Modi’s maritime ambition, with a focus on the Indian Ocean, is aimed at establishing India’s dominance in the region.16 Isabelle Saint-Mézard, “India’s Act East Policy: Strategic Implications for the Indian Ocean,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2016, p. 182. According to analysts, the Modi government has embarked on a more ambitious foreign policy to establish India’s advantageous status in the Indian Ocean, and puts emphasis on its special role in ensuring safety, promoting collective security and advancing economic integration in the Indian Ocean.17 C Raja Mohan, “Modi and the Indian Ocean: Restoring India’s Sphere of Influence,” p.6. By so doing, the Modi government elevates itself onto a higher moral ground,in an effort to win the hearts of Indian Ocean countries and increase its influence in the Indian Ocean region.

“Net security provider” in the Indian Ocean region

尝试提取和分离血液中的血红蛋白，体验从复杂体系中提取生物大分子的基本过程和方法；通过了解有关蛋白质研究领域的新进展，以血红蛋白为实验材料，学习提取和分离蛋白质的基本技术，激发学生兴趣，培养学生的实际操作能力。

While SAGAR stresses collective power and economic development,the “net security provider” concept highlights India’s unique role in regional security issues. The concept of “net security provider,” first put forward by the US government in 2009, was used to describe the importance of India’s role in the Indian Ocean region.18 Gurpreet S. Khurana, “India’s Maritime Strategy: Context and Subtext”, Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India, No.1, 2017, p.3. Now, this term is widely used by India’s decision-makers and analysts, which illustrates its acceptance of the concept.India first elaborated on this concept in the 2015 maritime security strategy,indicating that the Modi government would like to play an active role in regional security and stability.19 Ibid.

As concerns the maritime arena, India’s naval ships visit the Gulf countries almost every year. From May to November 2015, India’s naval vessels visited Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE. In May 2016, then Indian Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar visited the UAE and discussed bilateral defense cooperation, including maritime counterterrorism. Later, Parrikar visited Oman and signed four cooperative documents with his counterpart there, including the MOU on Maritime Issues and the MOU between the Royal Oman Police (Coast Guard)and the Indian Coast Guard in the field of Marine Crime Prevention at Sea. Oman becomes the only Gulf country that has deployed all three military services to joint military exercises with India.60 Ibid., p.64. Through maritime cooperation with the Gulf countries, India intends to expand its influence in the region, ensure the safety of sea lane, especially energy transportation.

India wants to play the role of a stabilizer in the Indian Ocean region, concomitantly establishing a global image as a major power. India would not want to be seen as a hegemon or regional police, but rather as a country that can cooperate on, promote, and safeguard common interests.Meanwhile, India would also like to use the concept of net security provider to show the United States that it is able to share responsibilities in the Indian Ocean region and serve as a reliable partner of the US in maritime cooperation.

Main Measures of Modi’s Indian Ocean Policy

In order to realize the above visions, the Modi government has taken the following measures:

Maritime cooperation with the US, Japan and Australia

Strengthening relations with Indian Ocean island nations

Despite their small sizes, most island nations in the Indian Ocean are located at strategic transportation hubs. Although India has historically valued relations with these island nations, in the past, few Indian leaders had actually visited these countries. However, this is no longer the case as Modi visited Mauritius, Seychelles and Sri Lanka in March 2015. While Modi was in Mauritius, the two governments signed five documents, including a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on the development of blue economy.23 Lindsay Hughes, “Modi and India’s Security in the Indian Ocean,” Strategic Analysis Paper, August 30, 2016, p.4. India also agreed to help Mauritius improve its air and maritime connectivity between South and North Agaléga islands, and provide $500 million in credit towards this cause.24 G. Padmaja, “Modi’s Maritime Diplomacy: A Strategic Opportunity,” p.28. Besides, India handed over a maritime patrol boat that it built for the Mauritian Coast Guard.25 Ibid. During Modi’s visit to Seychelles, the two countries signed five agreements, including an agreement which tasks India with helping upgrade the infrastructure on Seychelles’ Assumption Island, and decided to set up a joint working group on cooperation in blue economy. A decision was also taken by India to gift a second Dornier aircraft to Seychelles.26 G. Padmaja, “Modi’s Maritime Diplomacy: A Strategic Opportunity,” p.28. In addition, Modi inaugurated the first of the eight Coastal Surveillance Radar Systems being built by India.27 Lindsay Hughes, “Modi and India’s Security in the Indian Ocean,” p.3. When in Sri Lanka, Modi announced a $300 million credit to Sri Lanka.28 Ramtanu Maitra, “Modi Strengthens India’s Ties with Its Indian Ocean Neighbors,” Executive Intelligence Review, Vol. 42, No. 12, 2015, p.16. This Indian Ocean tour has strengthened India’s maritime strategic cooperation with these three island nations, and consolidated India’s overall presence in the Indian Ocean. It has become India’s core policy to “bring the island countries that run through the central Indian Ocean into a tight security and political embrace.”29 Pal Chaudhuri and Pramit, “Making Waves in Indian Ocean: PM Modi Building Bridges to Island States,” Hindustan Times, March 15, 2015, http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/making-waves-in-indianocean-modi-building-bridges-to-island-states/story-kPGjODlHJO2vlwgaaGhEdL.html.

（1）在路基施工结束后，为了防止社会车辆对施工造成影响，施工单位应及时联系交通部门，制定道路管制的方案，经过监理单位的审查之后及时实施。

Modi has visited all South Asian countries except the Maldives, but the Maldives President Abdulla Yameen has paid three visits to India since he took office in 2014. Yameen has identified India as his country’s “most important friend,” and stated that the Maldives would pursue a foreign policy that places its relations with India as a top priority.30 Prakash Gopal, “India and Maldives: A Triumph for Maritime Diplomacy,” in Vijay Sakhuja and Gurpreet S Khurana, Maritime Perspectives 2016, p.109. In August 2015,India helped the Maldives complete the first phase of installment on three coastal radar systems. In December 2015, India donated $240,000 to the Maldives for the operational expenses of its two helicopters.31 G. Padmaja, “Maldives President Visits India: Bilateral Partnership for Regional Security,” in Vijay Sakhuja and Gurpreet S Khurana, Maritime Perspectives 2016, p.120. In April 2016,India and the Maldives signed six agreements, including an action plan on defense cooperation.32 G. Padmaja, “Maldives President Visits India: Bilateral Partnership for Regional Security,” p.115. Through these measures, India has increased its influence over the Maldives, and sent a clear message to the country that it had to put India’s interests and concerns at a high priority.

图1显示，对照组小鼠十二指肠绒毛结构完整，排列疏松，但绒毛长度不均等；试验一组的绒毛结构完整、排列紧密、长度增长且均等、隐窝深度降低；试验二组绒毛结构完整、排列紧密，但绒毛长度不均等。

Advancing Project Mausam

Project Mausam33 This term derives from Arabic, referring to the season when ships can navigate safely. The Indian Ocean has southwesterly seasonal wind from May to September every year, and northeasterly seasonal wind from November to March the next year. In ancient times, businessmen, fishermen and sailors would utilize the seasonal wind to travel across the Indian Ocean, which helped form close cultural and economic ties among different parts in the Indian Ocean. is a cultural project that was first discussed at the end of the previous Indian National Congress government. However, due to government transition, it wasn’t until Modi became Prime Minister that it was clearly proposed. Despite eventual failure to be inscribed on the World Heritage List, India presented the concept to an international audience at the 38th session of the World Heritage Committee at Doha,Qatar in June 2014. This project has two objectives: “At the macro level,it aims to re-connect and re-establish communications between the Indian Ocean countries, which would lead to an enhanced understanding of cultural values and concerns”; “at the micro level, the focus is on understanding national cultures in their regional maritime milieu.”34 Ministry of Culture, Government of India, “Project Mausam,” http://www.indiaculture.nic.in/projectmausam. Project Mausam covers a large geographic area, stretching from East Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, the South Asian subcontinent and Sri Lanka, all the way to Southeast Asia.35 Thomas Daniel, “Project Mausam-A Preliminary Assessment of India’s Grand Maritime Strategy from a Southeast Asian Perspective,” in Vijay Sakhuja and Gurpreet S Khurana, Maritime Perspectives 2015,p.166. Five themes for this plan have already been developed: (1) knowledge and understanding of contextual history, particularly the period from 3000 BCE to the colonial times;(2) oral literature and literary writings that present a conceptualized Indian Ocean; (3) movable cultural relics and manmade objects, such as inscriptions, monuments and archaeological objects; (4) pilgrimage and religious tourism across the Indian Ocean; and (5) spice and relevant cultural products such as rituals, ceremonies and cuisine. This project is implemented by Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, New Delhi as the nodal coordinating agency with support of Archeological Survey of India and National Museum as associate bodies.36 Ministry of Culture, Government of India, “Project Mausam.”

Project Mausam, according to India’s Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar,“promotes archeological and historical research on cultural, commercial,and religious interactions. It has become a vehicle for knowledge exchanges, networking and publications.”37 Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy, “The Indian Ocean Policy of the Modi Government,” p.183. While the cultural veneer has made it easier to promote to other countries, Project Mausam has obviously gone beyond the scope of a cultural project, becoming an important component of the Modi government’s ambitious foreign policy,and in this regard has taken on a strategic meaning. The underlying intention of the Modi government is to increase India’s influence, and gain recognition of India’s important status in the Indian Ocean region.Project Mausam furthers this goal by enhancing both understanding of and identification with Indian culture among Indian Ocean countries. Analysts pointed out that Project Mausam looked more like a foreign policy initiative of the Modi government, with an aim towards rejuvenating the ancient maritime route by way of culture and trade connections between India and other Indian Ocean littoral countries.This project is likely to resemble the Look East policy during the Singh administration, which received scant attention at first but achieved important results in the end.38 Thomas Daniel, “Project Mausam-A Preliminary Assessment of India’s Grand Maritime Strategy from a Southeast Asian Perspective,” pp.165-166. Even though Project Mausam might not appear to contain any overt strategic intention, when coupled with other maritime initiatives advanced by the Indian government, it would become a power amplifier, winning the support of other countries while enriching their maritime cultural heritage, which is conducive to increasing India’s influence in the Indian Ocean.39 G. Padmaja, “Modi’s Maritime Diplomacy: A Strategic Opportunity,” p.34.

Enhancing the role of Indian Ocean governance mechanisms

1.2.2 外植体诱导 全部接种工作均在经严格灭菌的超净工作台上进行。消毒后的茎段在无菌条件下接种诱导，诱导试验方案见表2。接种数量为每种配方33瓶，每个处理接种10～11瓶，每瓶接4～5块外植体，重复2～3次，若由于一些外界或人为原因接种量适当增加。

水坝、筏形基础等大体积混凝土结构因混凝土尺寸较大，水泥水化热散失较慢，混凝土浇筑后因内外温差过大，产生较大温度应力使混凝土产生表面裂缝，严重的将造成深层裂缝或贯穿裂缝。因此对大体积混凝土温度影响因素进行研究，无论是对建筑物的耐久性还是使用寿命均有重要意义。在混凝土配合比设计中，掺加一些改性材料可以减少混凝土的水化热，降低混凝土最大温度，减少混凝土裂缝的产生。近年来计算机模拟仿真发展迅速，通过模拟仿真的方法研究大体积混凝土温度裂缝，对控制温度裂缝的研究提供了新途径。

The maritime cooperation between India and Japan has deepened in the 21st century, and is further bolstered under Modi. During Modi’s visit to Japan in September 2014, the two countries agreed to upgrade their bilateral relationship to a “special strategic and global partnership.”74 Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report 2014-15, p.37. Modi even called Japan the center of India’s Act East policy. During this trip, India and Japan decided to hold regular joint maritime exercises.Japan agreed to invest $35 billion over the next five years to help India build its infrastructure.75 Ibid. The two countries also reached consensus on maritime security, freedom of navigation, and peaceful resolution of maritime disputes through friendly negotiations.76 Annpurna Nautiyal, “US Security Strategy of Asian Rebalance: India’s Role and Concerns,” Strategic Analysis, Vol.41, No.1, 2017, p.22. In August 2015,Japan participated for the first time in the Malabar naval exercises held in the Bay of Bengal, which was the first time Japan conducted military exercises on the high seas off India.77 Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report 2015-16, p.44. The sixth Chief of Naval Staff meeting between the two countries was held in March 2016. In November the same year, Modi visited Japan again. During the trip,the two sides signed 11 agreements on peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, and maritime cooperation, among other issues.78 Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report 2016-17, p.50. In May 2017,the two countries discussed advancing the initiative of Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, which is an important component of the India-Japan Vision 2025: Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region, and extends geographically from the Asia-Pacific region to Africa, with infrastructure projects in Africa, Iran, Sri Lanka and Southeast Asian countries.79 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India, Japan Come up with AAGC to Counter China’s OBOR,” The Economic Times, May 26, 2017, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/india-japancome-up-with-aagc-to-counter-chinas-obor/articleshow/58846673.cms. During the Malabar naval exercise held in waters off India’s Chennai and the Bay of Bengal in July 2017, the largest in scale compared with previous exercises, India, the US, and Japan all sent out aircraft carriers or similar vessels for the first time. Compared with the Singh government, the Modi government has attached greater importance to the role of Japan in the Indo-Pacific region, and has enlarged and deepened its maritime cooperation with Japan.

The IORA, currently having six priority areas to promote sustainable growth and balanced development in the Indian Ocean region, ranks maritime security as the first priority.45 Gopal Suri, “India’s Maritime Security Concerns and the Indian Ocean Region,” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal Vol. 11, No. 3, July-September 2016, p. 247. As one of the founding members,India regards the IORA as an important instrument to pursue sustainable development and prosperity in the Indian Ocean region. As Modi said during his 2015 visit to Mauritius, “We often define regional groupings around landmass. The time has come for a strong grouping around the Indian Ocean. We will pursue this with new vigour in the years ahead.”46 Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy, “The Indian Ocean Policy of the Modi Government,” p. 176. Since then, the Modi government has actively participated in IORA activities and proposed several initiatives to strengthen cooperation in non-traditional security and promote economic development. In September 2015, India initiated and organized the first Indian Ocean Dialogue, where participants discussed the geo-strategic significance and security challenges of the Indian Ocean.47 G. Padmaja, “Modi’s Maritime Diplomacy: A Strategic Opportunity,” p. 33. During the 10th IORA ministerial conference in November 2015, India proposed a 10-point suggestion on the development of the association, including institutionalizing the Blue Economy Dialogue.48 Indian Ministry of External Affairs, “Indian Ocean Rim Association and India’s Role,” http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/IORA_new.pdf. Under the IORA framework, India held the first and second Blue Economy Dialogues in August and November 2016 respectively. India also held the first Experts Meeting on Maritime Safety and Security in August 2016, and an international symposium “The Future of Maritime Order in the Indian Ocean” in November 2016.49 Ibid. In 2017, India further held a ministerial meeting on renewable energy, an international conference on water security and sustainable development, and hosted the second Experts Meeting on Maritime Safety and Security.50 Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report 2016-17, p.20, http://mea.gov.in/annualreport-2016-17.htm. In March 2017, India’s Vice President Mohammad Hamid Ansari attended the first IORA summit in Jakarta, Indonesia, and announced India’s willingness to set up an IORA Centre of Excellence for strengthening maritime domain awareness in one of the coastal cities of India.51 “Vice President Attends IORA Leaders’ Summit at Jakarta,” March 8, 2017, https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/CountryNews/7499_Vice_President_attends_IORA_Leaders__Summit_at_Jakarta.pdf.

Started in 1995 and initiated by India, the Milan naval exercises are held every two years, except for temporary suspensions in 2005 and 2011. In order to expand its influence, India has been mobilizing other Indian Ocean countries to participate in these exercises, and it has played the role of organizer and coordinator in every exercise. Promoted by India,the number of participants in the exercise has been growing, increasing from 5 in 1995 to 17 in 2014.52 Smruti S. Pattanaik, “Indian Ocean in the Emerging Geo-strategic Context: Examining India’s Relations with Its Maritime South Asian Neighbors,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2016, p.135. The geographic scope of the participants has also widened, expanding from Southeast Asia to Western Indian Ocean countries like Kenya and Tanzania, as well as Indian Ocean island nations like Mauritius and Seychelles. As to India’s role in these exercises,the Indian commentator K. R. Singh pointed out that under India’s leadership, the Milan military exercises “tore down the barriers among different regions in the Indian Ocean, and showed that even without a super power, countries in the Indian Ocean could conduct maritime activities all by themselves, and even without an alliance mechanism like NATO, if there is political will, maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean region could also become a real possibility.”53 K.R.Singh, Maritime Security for India: New Challenges and Responses, New Delhi: New Century Publications, 2008, p.166. The Australian scholar David Brewster said that “The Indian Navy has successfully promoted itself as a relatively benign provider of public goods and maritime policing,” and “has also sought to institutionalize itself as the leading Indian Ocean navy through such initiatives as sponsoring the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium.”54 David Brewster, “Indian Strategic Thinking about the Indian Ocean: Striving Towards Strategic Leadership,” India Ocean Economic & Political Review, Vol.14, No.2, 2016, p.230.

Deepening relations with Gulf countries

The Gulf region is where India’s multiple interests converge. First,it is India’s biggest energy supplier. Over half of India’s crude oil and 85% of its liquefied natural gas imports come from the Gulf region.55 Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report 2016-17, p.58. Second, the region is also India’s largest trading partner. The trade between India and the Gulf countries reached $96.9 billion in 2016-2017.56 Ibid., p. 65. Third, the region is India’s largest source of overseas remittance.There are 8.5 million Indian migrant workers in the region, who send$35 billion back to India every year, accounting for around 52% of all remittance from overseas Indians.57 Harsh V. Pant, “Bridging the Gulf,” The Hindu, January 25, 2017, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/Bridging-the-Gulf/article17089302.ece. Furthermore, the Gulf region is an important destination of India’s outbound direct investment. Successive Indian governments have attached great importance to the Gulf region,where Pakistan traditionally has great influence that India wants to balance. Since taking office, Modi has shown his intention to inject new momentum into this relationship. Modi’s visit to the United Arab Emirates in August 2015, the first time an Indian Prime Minister visited the country since 1981, greatly improved the bilateral relations between India and the Gulf country. The UAE decided to set up a $75 billion fund for India’s infrastructure,58 Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report 2016-17, p.69. and sent Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan,Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, to attend the military parade on India’s Republic Day in January 2017. Modi visited Saudi Arabia in February 2016, becoming the fourth Indian Prime Minister to visit the country. In order to strike a balance between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Modi visited Iran in May 2016,making him the first foreign prime minister to visit Iran since the lifting of sanctions in January 2016. During the visit, the two sides signed 12 cooperation agreements, the most important of which was the agreement tasking India with helping construct Iran’s Chabahar port. This agreement set out a plan for India to invest $90 million in this construction project,with the aim of blazing a trade route via Afghanistan to Central Asia and Europe.59 Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report 2016-17, p.67. Modi also visited Qatar in June 2016, making him the first Indian Prime Minister to the country in eight years. The two sides signed seven cooperation agreements. These frequent high-level exchanges are conducive to strengthening the relationship between the Modi government and foreign governments, enhancing India’s energy security,and protecting interests of Indian migrant workers overseas.

With five central components, the initiative of Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) was first proposed by Modi in March 2015. First, India will try its best to protect the security of its mainland and islands, safeguard its national interests, and ensure the security and stability of the Indian Ocean for the benefit of the entire region. Second,India will deepen economic and security cooperation with maritime neighboring countries and island nations in the Indian Ocean, and help them build and improve their maritime security capabilities. Third,India will build collective action mechanisms for the Indian Ocean region, which can deepen mutual understanding of and enhance joint response capacity towards maritime challenges. These mechanisms are also conducive to combating piracy, terrorism and other transnational crimes.12 Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy, “The Indian Ocean Policy of the Modi Government,” pp.174-175. India will also help to respond to issues of safety and actions to be undertaken during natural disasters.13 G. Padmaja, “Modi’s Maritime Diplomacy: A Strategic Opportunity,” Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India, Vol.11, No.2, Winter 2015, p.27. Fourth, India will promote sustainable development of the Indian Ocean region, with a primary focus on maritime economy, or “blue economy.” Given its potentially devastating effects on the survival of citizens in littoral countries, climate change is also included under the category. Fifth, littoral countries of the Indian Ocean shoulder the major responsibility for maintaining regional peace, stability and prosperity. India acknowledges the interests of other countries in the Indian Ocean, and is ready to engage these countries through dialogues, visits, military exercises, capacity building and economic partnerships.14 Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy, “The Indian Ocean Policy of the Modi Government,” p.176.

According to this document, “net security describes the state of actual security available in an area, upon balancing prevailing threats, inherent risks and rising challenges in the maritime environment, against the ability to monitor, contain and counter all of these. The shaping or creation of conditions that enhance net maritime security would support our national maritime interests and maritime security objectives.” “A favorable maritime environment entails conditions of security and stability at sea,with various threats remaining at a very low level. A positive maritime environment implies conditions wherein any rise in threats can be prevented or contained.” “Together, this would provide net security.” There are three principles in net maritime security: “preservation of peace,” “promotion of stability” and “maintenance of security.” Transcribing these principles into sustained activity needs such actions as presence and rapid response,maritime engagement, capacity building and capability enhancement,developing regional maritime domain awareness, maritime security operations, and strategic communication. And it is one of India’s maritime security objectives “to shape a favorable and positive maritime environment,for enhancing net security in India’s areas of maritime interest.”20 Indian Navy, Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy, pp.78-82. India also aims to serve as the net security provider for its maritime neighbors,taking on such tasks as anti-piracy operations, non-combatant evacuation operations, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.21 Indian Navy, Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy, p.8. For India, becoming a net security provider is not only the responsibility of a major regional power, but is also of significance to India’s economic growth and prosperity.22 Gurpfujreet S Khurana, “‘Net Security Provider’ Defined: An Analysis of India’s New Maritime Strategy 2015,” in Vijay Sakhuja and Gurpreet S Khurana, Maritime Perspectives 2015, New Delhi:National Maritime Foundation, 2016, p.64.

计算机造型技能的掌握，使学生可以根据视图或自己的想象构造形体，并实时验证思维正确性。促进了学生三维形状和二维图形之间直觉思维的形成。是不可多得的自主学习的好方式。

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the US-India relations have become closer. Due to its concern over the possible negative political consequences as a result of a closer strategic alignment with the US, the Singh government had reservations about cooperating with the US on maritime issues,61 C Raja Mohan, “Modi and the Indian Ocean: Restoring India’s Sphere of Influence,” p.3. to the point that it reduced its participation in the naval exercises with the US and Japan.62 Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, “New Delhi at Sea: The China Factor in the Indian Ocean Policy of the Modi and Singh Governments,” Asia Policy, No. 22, July 2016, p.29. However, since coming to power, Modi has actively pushed for the strengthening of US-India relations and US-India maritime cooperation. During Modi’s September 2014 visit to the US, the two sides issued a joint communiqué announcing that “the leaders expressed concern about rising tensions over maritime territorial disputes, and affirmed the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and over-flight through the region, especially in the South China Sea.”63 The White House (President Barack Obama), “U.S.-India Joint Statement,” September 30, 2014,https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/30/us-india-joint-statement. During then US President Barack Obama’s visit to India in January 2015, the two countries stressed strengthening cooperation in such areas as maritime security and building counter-terrorism mechanisms.64 Rakesh Sood, “A Visit and Outcomes in Superlatives,” The Hindu, January 27, 2015, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/a-visit-and-outcomes-in-superlatives/article6824148.ece. In June 2015, then US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter and Indian Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar signed a 10-year defense framework agreement, which was first signed in 2005. According to the new agreement,the two sides would have higher-level consultations and communications that cover a wider range of issues. As Carter’s predecessor Chuck Hagel stated earlier, “This renewed framework will support stronger military-tomilitary engagement, including deeper maritime cooperation and increased opportunities in technology and trade.”65 “A New Chapter in Defence Ties, Says Hagel,” The Hindu, January 26, 2015, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/a-new-chapter-in-defence-ties-says-hagel/article6822129.ece. During Carter’s another trip to India in April 2016, the two countries agreed to set up a new high-level dialogue mechanism for maritime security.66 Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report 2016-17, p.136. In May the same year, the first US-India Maritime Security Dialogue, between Indian officials of Defense and External Affairs Ministries and their US counterparts, was held in India.Furthermore, the two countries also agreed to include Japan as a regular participant in the Malabar naval exercise.67 Harsh V. Pant and Yogesh Joshi, “Indo-US Relations under Modi: The Strategic Logic Underlying the Embrace,” International Affairs, Vol.93, No.1, 2017, p.140. Since Japan is a close ally of the United States, by inviting Japan to the annually-held naval exercise, India intends to further enhance its relations with the US, strengthen its maritime cooperation with Japan, and increase its presence in the Indian Ocean and the West Pacific.

Maritime cooperation between India and Australia had been rather limited, but under Modi, the scenario has also changed. Modi visited Australia in November 2014, making him the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Australia in 28 years. The trip greatly improved the relationship of the two countries, culminating in the signing of a Framework for Security Cooperation. The two sides also held their first joint naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal in September 2015.

The main governance mechanisms in the Indian Ocean region include the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium,40 The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, taking the form of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, is a new type of military cooperation framework, focusing on maritime security and relief and countering such activities as terrorist attacks and piracy. Established in 2008, the Symposium divides the Indian Ocean into four sub-regions, namely South Asia, West Asia, east coast of Africa, and Southeast Asia and Australia. The Symposium now has 35 members and holds a naval leadership meeting every two years. the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA)41 The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), whose predecessor was the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation, was founded in 1997 and changed to the current name in 2013. The IORA, with 21 member countries, is the first big organization on economic cooperation in the Indian Ocean region, and is also the only economic cooperation organization that covers the entire Indian Ocean. and the Milan multilateral naval exercise, with India playing a dominant role in all three. The Singh government initiated the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium and organized its first conference.As the biggest sponsor and supporter, India desires to play a major role in the symposium and serve as a balancer in the Indian Ocean region.42 P. K. Ghosh, “Indian Ocean Naval Symposium: Uniting the Maritime Indian Ocean Region,” Strategic Analysis, Vol.36, No.3, May-June 2012, p.357. For Modi, the Symposium would deepen mutual understanding of and enhance joint response capacity towards maritime challenges, and therefore India would support the efforts to strengthen regional maritime cooperation mechanisms that deal with a wide range of issues from countering terrorism and piracy to responding to natural disasters.43 Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy, “The Indian Ocean Policy of the Modi Government,” p. 175. In August 2015, a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief working conference was hosted by India, in which participants discussed the guiding principles of assistance and relief. A sandbox simulation was also conducted where an Indian Ocean island nation is in need of help following a hurricane. In the Fifth Indian Ocean Naval Symposium held in Bangladesh in January 2016, then India’s Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Robin K. Dhowan elaborated on the guiding principles of rapid and effective humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.44 “Navy Cief in Bangladesh for Indian Ocean Naval Symposium”, http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/navy-chief-in-bangladesh-for-indian-ocean-naval-symposium-116011000718_1.html,accessed on November 20, 2017.

2.2.4.1 危害症状。叶尖(修剪切口附近)产生细小的条斑，病斑颜色灰色至褐色。严重时叶片上部褪绿变褐死亡。有时在老病斑上产生黄褐色至黑色的小粒点。受害草坪稀薄，呈现枯焦状(图4)。

The USS Theodore Roosevelt (right) aircraft carrier, Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer JS Fuyuzuki (left) alongside the Indian Deepak-class fleet tanker INS Shakti (center) during the Malabar Exercise 2015. (AFP/ US Navy)

In January 2015, India and the US released the Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region, emphasizing further cooperation in the vast area.68 “US-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region,” January 25, 2015,http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl%2F24728%2FUSIndia_Joint_Strategic_Vision_for_the_AsiaPacific_and_Indian_Ocean_Region. In May 2016, the two countries concluded a “white shipping agreement” to improve data sharing on cargo ships, and agreed to set up a dialogue mechanism on maritime security.69 Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report 2016-17, p.137. During Modi’s trip to Washington in June the same year, the US for the first time designated India as a “major defense partner,” making India enjoy a status commensurate with that of the closest allies and partners of the US.70 Ankit Panda, “US Implementation of ‘Major Defense Partner’ Perks for India Underway,” The Diplomat, April 14, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/us-implementation-of-major-defense-partnerperks-for-india-underway. Then in August 2016, the two countries finalized the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), which had been a decade in the making.71 The Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement was proposed as early as 2004, but the Singh government was reluctant to sign it for fear a military alignment with the US might constrain its strategic autonomy. The Modi government’s decision to early finalize the agreement indicated that Modi was more willing to forge closer ties with the US and its allies in terms of Indian Ocean affairs. According to the LEMOA, the US and Indian militaries will utilize each other’s sea, land and air bases to carry out such logistic activities as replenishment of supplies, and repair and maintenance. The signing of this document is not only of military significance, but also marks India’s shift from hesitation to determination in its efforts to build an effective strategic partnership with the US.72 Harsh V. Pant and Yogesh Joshi, “Indo-US Relations under Modi: The Strategic Logic Underlying the Embrace,” p.143. In June 2017, Modi paid his fifth visit to the US in three years. In his meeting with Modi, the new US President Donald Trump said that “the relationship between India and the United States has never been stronger, never been better.”73 “Donald Trump Says US–India Ties Have ‘Never Been Stronger’, Praises PM Modi,” Hindustan Times, June 27, 2017, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/narendra-modi-has-been-a-great-primeminister-india-doing-very-well-trump/story-beB5q9XSDiX09uodqpqolM.html. As pointed out by analysts, the India-US relations have undergone qualitative changes under the Modi government. Although previous administrations also maintained good relations with the US, the bilateral relations reached a new high under Modi, and broke the constraints of India’s traditional“non-alliance” policy tenets.

Furthermore, the Modi government has also strengthened its maritime cooperation with Southeast Asian countries as well as Bangladesh in South Asia. In October 2014, direct bi-weekly container shipping service was launched between India and Myanmar, which, in India’s vision, aims at creating a transport connection between India’s eastern littoral and the landlocked northeastern region through Myanmar.80 Isabelle Saint-Mézard, “India’s Act East Policy: Strategic Implications for the Indian Ocean,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol.12, No.2, 2016, p.183. India has intended to use Bangladesh’s Chittagong port and carve out a sea gate for its deep inland northeastern region.81 Ibid., p.184. India and Myanmar signed an agreement on joint maritime patrols in February 2016, making Myanmar the third Southeast Asian country after Thailand and Indonesia to formally sign such an agreement with India.82 Ibid., p.186. In July 2014, the Modi government accepted the ruling of the Arbitration Tribunal set up under the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague on its maritime demarcation with Bangladesh, which resolved a long-standing maritime dispute between the two countries.83 Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report 2014-15, p.5. During Modi’s visit to Bangladesh in May 2016, the two sides agreed to develop blue economy, and discussed possibilities in such areas as joint maritime patrols, naval exercises, joint monitoring of exclusive economic zones, information exchanges on civilian vessel shipping,expansion of maritime security cooperation in the Bay of Bengal, and promoting ship-building cooperation.84 Smruti S. Pattanaik, “Indian Ocean in the Emerging Geo-strategic Context: Examining India’s Relations with Its Maritime South Asian Neighbors,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol.12, No.2, 2016, p.137. The Indian Coast Guard visited Bangladesh for the first time in September 2016. There had been a lack of cooperation between coast guards of the two countries due to the longsimmering maritime dispute. Following settlement of the dispute, however,their maritime cooperation would increase accordingly, with this visit as an important start.

Gap between Objectives and Realities

Despite confidence and ambitions, the realization of Modi’s objectives towards the Indian Ocean remains far from easy.

Naval capabilities in need of improvement

In the hope of playing a dominant role in the Indian Ocean, the Modi government has been relying upon a strong comprehensive maritime combat force, utilizing overseas military bases and strategic pillars,uniting with neighboring countries in the Indian Ocean, and managing Indian Ocean affairs in terms of security, trade, energy and humanitarian assistance in a relative exclusive manner. However, this objective is still far from attainable.85 Li Jiasheng, “Evaluation of Effects of India’s Maritime Strategy,” Pacific Journal, Vol.24, No.4, 2016,p.67. India’s naval power is leading the littoral countries in the Indian Ocean, but it still pales in comparison with other great powers.

In terms of input, India’s military expenditure stood at $55.92 billion in 2016, while the United States reached $611.19 billion, Russia$69.25 billion, China $215.18 billion, and Japan $46.13 billion, making India’s defense spending only above that of the militarily restrained Japan.86 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex. Furthermore, in terms of specific expenditure of the three military services, the navy has long been the least funded, with its average proportion accounting for less than 16% of the total expenditure in 2014-2016, and further decreasing to 14% in 2017, quite off the mark for the 25% target set by the government.87 Iskander Rehman, “India’s Fitful Quest for Sea Power,” India Review, Vol.16, No.2, 2017, p.227. Moreover, 60% of warships in the Indian Navy are reaching retirement age, while the ones under construction cannot be delivered on schedule due to lack of funding and inefficiency. To a large extent, this further constrains the effectiveness of the Indian Navy, making it doubtful whether India is able to adequately deploy its naval forces to a theatre of operations where rapid response is necessitated.88 Ibid., p.244. India also lacks the strategic capability to shape the wider environment beyond its immediate neighborhood.89 Harjeet Singh, India’s Strategic Culture: The Impact of Geography, New Delhi: W Publishers Pvt Ltd,2009, p.25. Therefore, just as an Indian analyst pointed out, “if Delhi succeeds in bridging the gap between good ideas and the implementation thereof, India could restore its sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean.”90 Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy, “The Indian Ocean Policy of the Modi Government,” p.184.

Inadequate naval capabilities also prevent India from denying other powers’ access the Indian Ocean. The United States is currently the real dominant player in the Indian Ocean, with its Central Command, Africa Command, and the Fifth Fleet all participating in Indian Ocean affairs. It has been estimated that the US spends between US$47 billion and US$98 billion per year to secure the Persian Gulf.91 Jan Hornat, “The Power Triangle in the Indian Ocean: China, India and the United States,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2016, p.434. The US would not tolerate India to challenge its established status. If India’s actions conflicted with the US core interests in the Indian Ocean, the close maritime cooperation between the two countries would break down and the cost would be unbearable for India. Currently, the huge capability gap between India and the US can hardly be bridged or even reversed in the near future, which makes Modi’s objective, transforming India into the dominant power within the Indian Ocean region, unlikely to materialize. Present circumstances only allow the Modi government, under the US leadership, to play a role in Indian Ocean affairs, in the meantime gradually consolidating its power and expanding its influence. Similarly, it is very difficult for India to challenge the presence of other major powers in the Indian Ocean, such as the UK,France, Germany, Japan, Russia and China. For the sake of practicality, it would be best for India to cooperate with these countries.

Maritime disputes with neighboring countries

India is involved in maritime disputes with Pakistan. Their maritime disputes have arisen from their differing interpretations of internal waters,territorial seas, exclusive economic zones, and limits of the continental shelf. Their disputes of internal waters and territorial seas revolve around the mouth of the 60-mile Sir Creek in the Rann of Kutch marshland where it opens up into the Arabian Sea. This area is adjacent to the Gujarat State of India and the Sindh Province of Pakistan. Pakistan relies on a 1914 map to demarcate the boundary at the east bank of Sir Creek’s estuary, while India insists on dividing the river by the mid-channel.92 Sugandha, Evolution of Maritime Strategy and National Security of India, New Delhi: D. K. Print World (P) Limited, 2008, p.7. With regard to maritime demarcation beyond territorial waters, Pakistan sticks to the equity principle, while India insists on the equal-distance principle in dividing the exclusive economic zones and continental shelves.93 K.R.Singh, Maritime Security for India: New Challenges and Responses, p.170. Since these disputed areas are rich in oil and gas reserves, neither side will give in to the other. At stake is the 250 square miles of sea surface and sea bed, which amounts to a winner take all scenario.94 Sugandha, Evolution of Maritime Strategy and National Security of India, p.131. The two countries are thus often involved in quarrels and even military conflicts due to this dispute.

翁结水库位于云南省临沧市耿马傣族佤族自治县，为澜沧江二级支流南碧河上规划建设的一座中型水库，总库容3880万m3，坝址距离澜沧江一级支流小黑江口67km。水库开发任务主要为生产生活和灌溉供水。水库运行后，坝址下游河道水量减少，造成了长67km的河段不同程度减水。河道减水后将使区间河流水面缩窄，水深变浅，流速趋小，河流的纳污能力下降，另一方面，灌区退水经沿线支流又汇入南碧河。为确保工程运行后，减水河段水质目标不下降，需下泄一定水量用于下游河道污染物稀释水量。

Pakistan’s maritime strategy takes India as its imaginary enemy and a target to develop its navy. Due to its weaker naval capability and a military expenditure only one seventh the amount of India’s,95 Waqar-un-Nisa, “Pakistan-India Equation: Determinants, Dynamics and the Outlook,” Policy Perspectives, Vol.14, No.1, 2017, p.31. Pakistan cannot pose a serious threat to India’s maritime capability, but it can distract India from focusing all its resources on seeking its maritime ambitions. Sartaj Aziz, former Advisor to the Pakistani Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs,once said, “We are planning to highlight the dangerous implications of India’s plans to nuclearise the Indian Ocean at all relevant international fora. Pakistan is fully prepared to defend its people and its borders …Despite limitations of resources, Pakistan has developed a robust nuclear deterrence which is constantly updated.”96 “Pakistan to Push UN to Declare Indian Ocean Nuclear-free Zone,” The Indian Express May 20,2016, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/pakistan-to-push-un-to-declare-indian-oceannuclear-free-zone-2810100. He also alleged on another occasion that, “India’s evolving expansionist maritime security strategy and undemarcated border of Sir Creek, pose a threat to the security of the Indian Ocean…We are aware of our national interests and every effort will be made to strengthen our capacity to ensure that we remain ready to meet the emerging maritime security challenges.”97 “Pakistan Concerned over Peace in Indian Ocean: Sartaj Aziz,” The Indian Express February 11, 2017,http://indianexpress.com/article/world/pakistan-concerned-over-peace-in-indian-ocean-sartaj-aziz. Generally, Pakistan poses two concerns for India, one being its cooperation with other major powers, which might change the balance of power between India and Pakistan in confrontations; the other being that it might use asymmetrical measures to attack India, on land as well as at sea.98 K.R.Singh, Maritime Security for India: New Challenges and Responses, p.49. Former Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Dhowan once indicated that “Islamic terrorists could hijack Pakistani naval vessels to attack Indian ships and installations,”like the terrorist attack on Karachi naval base in September 2014 in an attempt to hijack Pakistani warships with the ostensible purpose to use them against Indian and US ships, which would be “a very, very serious situation.”99 Camelia Nathaniel, “India, China Heading for Standoff Over Ocean Security,” p.11. The maritime dispute with Pakistan deprives India of a peaceful environment for development in South Asia and the North Indian Ocean. As the renowned American South Asia scholar Stephen Cohn indicated, even if India is rising to become a major Asian power with global ambitions, its foreign policy would still be constrained by its relations with Pakistan.100 Stephen P. Cohen and Rohan S. Sandhu, “Rising India’s Pakistan Problem,” International Studies,Vol.47, No.2-4, 2010, p.413.

Although India’s other neighbors are not involved in maritime disputes with India, their foreign policies are not necessarily pro-India.For these countries, the most important objective is protecting their own security by utilizing the balance of power among major countries.101 Smruti S. Pattanaik, “Indian Ocean in the Emerging Geo-Strategic Context: Examining India’s Relations with Its Maritime South Asian Neighbors,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol.12, No.2,2016, p.138. For example, Sri Lanka learned that neglecting the interests of any major power would bring itself trouble, and therefore it decided to pursue a balanced diplomacy by maintaining friendly relations with key major powers, refraining from harming anyone’s interests, and avoiding unfair competition with them, in order to protect its own interests.102 Gulbin Sultana, “Sri Lanka after Rajapaksa: Can It Ignore China?” Strategic Analysis, Vol.40, No.4,2016, pp.250-251. Based on this thinking, Sri Lanka would handle its relations with India for the sake of its own national interests, instead of following India’s will. Similarly, the current Maldives President Abdulla Yameen takes India as a priority in his foreign policy, but his government still seeks to develop friendly relations with other major powers. Since India once supported the Maldives’ former President Mohamed Nasheed, who was defeated by Yameen, it makes matters even more complicated.103 Smruti S. Pattanaik, “Indian Ocean in the Emerging Geo-strategic Context: Examining India’s Relations with Its Maritime South Asian Neighbors,” p.138. The balanced diplomacy adopted by its maritime neighbors makes India’s policy unlikely to win genuine support from these countries, which makes it even more difficult for India to accomplish its vision of Security and Growth for All in the Region.

Conclusion

Compared with the previous Singh government, the Modi government attaches greater importance to the Indian Ocean, adopts more specific and systematic measures for its Indian Ocean policy, and promotes these measures with greater efforts. This is a reflection of the Modi government’s ultimate goal to rejuvenate India. However, it must be pointed out that, despite efforts to differentiate his Indian Ocean policy from his predecessors to highlight his governance ability, Modi has still inherited some measures adopted by previous governments. For example,the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, Project Mausam, and even the Act East policy were adopted or deliberated on in the previous administration,while the Modi government simply updated or upgraded them to bring them to life. Likewise, without the foundation laid by previous governments, the Modi government would find it hard to consolidate,deepen and upgrade its maritime cooperation with other countries. From this perspective, the Indian Ocean policy under Modi reflects continuity from previous governments.

The current developments show that the Modi government, which is highly interested in and has great ambitions for the Indian Ocean,will continue to actively advance its Indian Ocean policy. Due to its suspicions towards China’s entry into the Indian Ocean, Modi’s policy might have a negative impact on the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiative. On one hand, the refusal of India, a key stop along the route of the Maritime Silk Road, to join this initiative would make the projects involving India more difficult to advance. On the other hand, if India uses its special status in the Indian Ocean to put pressure on or provide assistance to other countries, it would hinder their all-round cooperation with China even if these countries have already joined this initiative.Therefore, China needs to strengthen communication and exchange with Indian Ocean countries including India, in an effort to ensure a smooth advancement of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road in the Indian Ocean region.